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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Today’s acquisition environment is characterized by the involvement of many 
stakeholders, including executives at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
Secretary of Navy (SECNAV), Program Executive Office (PEO), Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Combatant Commands, and Fleet commands (not to mention the men 
and women who actually utilize military systems).  Key stakeholders will readily agree 
that meeting the mission needs of the Warfighter is the primary objective of an 
acquisition program, however many stakeholders have developed their own strategies to 
achieve that objective.   
Today, Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) program is at 
a critical juncture in its acquisition lifecycle.  Important issues faced by GCCS-M 
include: 
• GCCS-M is fielded today on over 300 ships and at 100 shore sites.  The 
products in the field must be supported with trouble assists, training, logistics, 
and documentation.  Some submarines are receiving GCCS-M installations for 
the first time in 2003, while other ships are receiving modernized Commercial 
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) computer equipment.  Corrective, perfective, and 
adaptive software updates are distributed regularly.   
• GCCS-M has been using informal evolutionary acquisition techniques since 
1988, however recent 5000 series guidance formalizes the evolutionary 
acquisition process.  Some stakeholders have identified compliance with 
statutory and regulatory requirements as a high priority.   
• During 2004, GCCS-M is conducting its largest Operational Test of new 
capability since 1998.  The program will begin fielding significant, long-
awaited enhancements such as PC and web-based capabilities later that year.  
During 2004 the program needs to refine its technology roadmap and solidify 
plans for its next release. 
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• The Chief of Naval Operations resource sponsor is developing a Capability 
Development Document (CDD) for GCCS-M’s next major block using the 
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on the requirements 
process (CJCS, 2003).  A revised cost estimate, acquisition program baseline, 
and acquisition strategy will be required to field the capabilities defined in the 
CDD. 
• Service-unique command and control capabilities are being merged into a 
Joint capability that ensures the service C2 systems are interoperable.  The 
Joint Command and Control architecture is transitioning from a client-server 
model developed in the early 1990’s to an architecture based on network 
centric enterprise services. 
• The program’s sole-source development and integration contract is expiring in 
2004, and guidance has been provided to competitively award the next 
contract.  The previous contract has been sole sourced for over 15 years.  The 
planned contract award provides an opportunity to incorporate current 
contracting best practices to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
acquisition process. 
• GCCS-M heavily leverages off the shelf computer hardware and software.  
The commercial information technology marketplace continues to move at a 
fast pace, challenging the DOD acquisition process to keep pace as products 
become obsolete after just months on the market. 
 There are many alternative courses of action GCCS-M could take in response to 
the above events.  Understanding key stakeholders’ expectations is an enabler of the 
strategic planning process the program must go through to define its future.  Each 
stakeholder views GCCS-M from a perspective that is influenced by job duties, personal 
experiences with the program, prior and present relationships with individuals in the 
program office, and historical events.  Some stakeholders have responsibilities defined in 
statue or regulation, as well as the positional authority delegated by a supervisor or senior 
officer in the reporting chain of command.  Even though the individuals who occupy key 
positions in organizations change periodically, staffers remain behind who provide 
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corporate memory.  The Navy and Joint C4I community is not large; individuals in key 
decision making positions have been involved with GCCS-M as users, interfacing 
program managers, and contractors.  Relationships are bi-directional.  For each 
stakeholder who has formed perceptions about GCCS-M, the program has formed similar 
perceptions about the stakeholder that influence how the program acts.   
Stakeholder expectations are different than program requirements.  For an 
acquisition program, there is only one official source of requirements:  a Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirements document.  The latest 
Department of Defense (DOD) 5000 guidance (DOD, 2003) establishes evolutionary 
acquisition as the preferred acquisition strategy and spiral development as the preferred 
method of implementing evolutionary acquisition.  Navy acquisition programs such as 
GCCS-M that utilize evolutionary acquisition benefit from hands-on Fleet operational 
usage to guide enhancements and upgrades.  Direct operational feedback improves the 
quality of the product, but it also provides more opportunities for stakeholders to provide 
input and direction.  Under evolutionary acquisition, separating product development 
from product support is impossible since both occur concurrently and utilize the same 
financial, infrastructure, and human resources.   
DOD systems of all types have struggled to maintain pace with commercial 
technology.  As acquisition reform has unfolded over the past decade, each successive 
revision to the DOD 5000 series has taken a more proactive, encouraging stance towards 
the integration of commercial technologies into DOD systems.  Commercial technologies 
have the upside potential to reduce development cost and schedule, but have 
demonstrated lifecycle cost and supportability challenges that have yet to be fully 
understood or overcome.  DOD has embraced information technology as a key enabler of 
“net centric warfare”, and as a national asset that can be exploited to achieve an 
asymmetric advantage over any opponent we might encounter.  Adoption of commercial 
information technology including hardware, operating systems, databases, office 
productivity, electronic mail, and collaboration tools has been rapid.  Stakeholders 
continue to push the speed of technology adoption from the top as a mechanism for 
transforming concepts of operation. 
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The job of the program manager within the acquisition system is to deliver a 
product that best meets stakeholder expectations (the right product delivered the right 
way).  This research study outlines a formal methodology for eliciting stakeholder 
expectations, and applies it to the GCCS-M program. 
B. PURPOSE 
This purpose of this research study is to obtain feedback on the program’s 
performance to date and capture stakeholders’ current and future expectations.  The 
GCCS-M Program Management Office has had numerous face-to-face and email 
discussions with stakeholders, but has never conducted a formal assessment of the 
program’s performance relative to stakeholder expectations.  Understanding stakeholder 
expectations is a critical part of any product development effort.  Stakeholders include the 
end users of a product, but also include the organizations and individuals who finance, 
authorize, and review product development activities.  This research study will establish a 
methodology for identifying key stakeholders and critical topics of interest that could be 
applied to other acquisition programs. 
The results of this research will be used to improve the program’s strategic plan, 
acquisition strategy, contracting strategy, budget submission, and product development 
and support processes. Analysis of stakeholder expectations will identify areas where the 
program needs to improve responsiveness and possibly work to correct stakeholder 
attitudes that are not wholly accurate.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary purpose of this research is to capture GCCS-M stakeholder 
expectations.  Since the program has never formally gathered stakeholder expectations it 
is not clear how this should be done.  Accordingly, there are two categories of research 
questions addressed in this study.  The first category of questions relates to the specific 
information the program office wishes to obtain from its stakeholders.  The second 
category of questions relates to identifying an appropriate, repeatable process that can be 
applied to obtain the desired information. 
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1. GCCS-M Research Questions 
The GCCS-M program would like to incorporate stakeholder assessments and 
expectations into future plans.  The program would like stakeholders to provide inputs 
that help the program understand its operating environment and desired end states, 
including answers to the following questions: 
1. How do key stakeholders assess GCCS-M’s performance in critical focus 
areas? 
2. How could GCCS-M better meet stakeholder expectations in areas that 
stakeholders are concerned about? 
3. How could process, cultural or strategy changes improve the program’s 
performance without new funding? 
4. How could the program’s priorities be changed to better meet the needs of 
stakeholders? 
2. Design of Study Research Questions 
Stakeholder feedback must be focused in areas that the program office can act on, 
but stakeholders also need to be given sufficient opportunity to express opinions and 
desires that the program office has not previously identified as being important.  The 
following research questions will be answered during the design of the study: 
1. Which stakeholders should be involved in the study? 
2. What questions should be asked of stakeholders to ensure that data is 
actionable and complete? 
3. How should stakeholders be approached for their inputs? 
4. How will the data collected from the stakeholders be analyzed and presented 
so that the results can be understood? 
5. How can the methodology applied to this research be applied to other 
acquisition programs? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The benefits of this study are two-fold.  First, this research will elicit and 
document GCCS-M stakeholder expectations for use during strategic planning.  The 
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information gathered will be used as an input to improve program technology roadmaps, 
acquisition management plans, contracting strategy, and requirements documents.  
Results may also be used to define quantitative performance measures that will provide 
timelier, more objective measures of program performance.  In addition to direct 
stakeholder feedback, a thorough analysis of the GCCS-M stakeholders and historical 
event timelines should uncover lessons learned that could be incorporated to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the program.   
Second, this research provides a qualitative research methodology that other 
acquisition programs lacking clear quantitative performance measures could use to assess 
performance and identify stakeholder expectations.  Although each acquisition program 
has a different set of stakeholders, needs, and requirements, each program’s acquisition is 
guided by the same Congressional statutes and DOD policies.  Each program maintains 
relationships with Congress, executive branch political appointees, industry, and end 
users.  In the end, every DOD product directly or indirectly provides warfighting utility 
that can be assessed by its operational users.   
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This scope of this thesis is focused on the completion of activities required to 
obtain stakeholder inputs.  First, multiple alternatives for performing qualitative research 
will be evaluated to determine what methods and tools exist.  Once appropriate methods 
have been identified, a process for applying them to the problem of eliciting stakeholder 
feedback in a DOD acquisition program will be defined.  With a defined research 
process, the next step will be to examine the GCCS-M environment, including an 
analysis of stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities and historic events that influence 
stakeholder’s beliefs about the program.  The output of the environmental analysis will be 
a list of specific stakeholders to be consulted and focus areas and questions that elicit 
stakeholder input.  Using a peer-reviewed, structured, and consistent process, each 
stakeholder will be approached to obtain feedback.  Stakeholder inputs will be formatted 
to facilitate comparison.  Finally, conclusions based on stakeholder feedback will be 
presented as input into a future GCCS-M strategic plan.   
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This research study is organized into six chapters.  Chapter I provides a brief 
introduction and summary of this thesis.  Using a literature review of mixed-method 
research techniques, Chapter II provides a structured, repeatable process for eliciting 
inputs from DOD acquisition stakeholders.  Chapter III analyzes the GCCS-M program 
environment, including identification of stakeholders’ interests in the program and 
historical events that have influenced stakeholders’ current perceptions of the program.  
Based on the methodology defined in Chapter II and the environmental analysis of 
Chapter III, Chapter IV identifies the specific individuals to be consulted, the questions 
they are to be asked, and the raw data gathered from the stakeholders.  Chapter V 
provides synthesis and analysis of the results, conclusions, lessons learned, and 

























II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
GCCS-M program office staff members have exchanged many written 
communications with key stakeholders over the past 15 years, as well as holding 
numerous face-to-face discussions and reviews.  These communications have provided 
guidance and direction shaping the evolution of the program, but they tend to be provided 
in ways that force the program office to react rather than anticipate.  This research is the 
first time the GCCS-M program office has applied a structured technique to proactively 
obtain feedback from stakeholders. 
Consider the following scenario as one example that illustrates the importance of 
long-term, proactive planning in the DOD acquisition process.  The DOD 5000 series 
(DOD, 2003a; DOD, 2003b) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements instruction 
(CJCS, 2003) provide very clear guidance on how requirements should be resourced and 
managed throughout the acquisition lifecycle.  A JROC-validated Capabilities 
Development Document (CDD) provides the program’s definition, and a Program Life 
Cycle Cost Estimate (PLCCE) identifies the resources required to implement the 
capabilities in the CDD.  The PLCCE is then used as the basis for developing an 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and serves as the resource input into the DOD 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).  The PPBS is built around a six-
year planning period that begins two years after the current execution year (CNO, 2003).   
An acquisition program must have a validated cost estimate at least 2 to 4 years before 
funding is needed in order to initiate funding through the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM).  The informal communication process used by GCCS-M and its 
stakeholders prevents using the planning processes outlined in the DOD 5000 series 
because inputs are received too late.  The result is frequent execution year re-planning 
and increased compliance oversight from stakeholders at the OSD and DON levels. 
Stakeholder inputs that are actionable can be feed into the program’s acquisition 
baseline, updated Capability Development Document, cost estimate, and POM 
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submission.  Since the quality of these documents will be directly related to the quality of 
the inputs obtained from stakeholders, a formal methodology for eliciting stakeholder 
expectations is desirable. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
The first step towards finding a practical process for eliciting and analyzing 
stakeholder inputs is to look at the different general research approaches available.  Three 
research design approaches are identified (Creswell, 2003): 
• A quantitative approach is one in which the investigator describes knowledge 
using techniques such as cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific 
variables and hypotheses and questions, measurement and observation, and 
the test of theories.  Strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys are 
employed, and the data collected can be analyzed using statistical methods. 
• A qualitative approach is one in which the inquirer makes knowledge claims 
based on constructivist perspectives, such as the multiple meanings of 
individual experiences.   The social and historical contexts of these multiple 
meanings are analyzed with the intent of developing a theory, pattern, or 
advocacy perspective.  The researcher collects open-ended, emerging data 
with the primary intent of developing themes from the data. 
• A mixed methods approach is one in which the researcher bases knowledge 
claims on pragmatic grounds (consequence-oriented, problem-centered, and 
pluralistic).  Strategies of inquiry used involve collecting data simultaneously 
or sequentially to best understand the research problem.  The data collection 
involves gathering of numeric information (e.g. from instruments) as well as 
text information (e.g. on interviews) so that the final database represents both 
quantitative and qualitative information. 
A mixed methods research design provides the most flexibility to thoroughly 
answer the GCCS-M research questions.  A broad survey of background material must be 
done before any stakeholders are approached in order to identify the correct stakeholders 
and define questions whose answers are beneficial to GCCS-M strategic planning.  Once 
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the stakeholders are known and useful questions have been prepared, the stakeholders 
must be approached in a manner that both ensures their participation and guarantees their 
inputs are relevant to the concerns of the GCCS-M program.  Competing demands for 
key stakeholder’s time necessitate a process that can be completed in 20 minutes.  
Stakeholders will only be approached once for input, but the concerns facing the GCCS-
M program are broad and complex.  The data gathering process will need to be rapidly 
understood by the stakeholder, and the process will need to be structured to maintain 
focus on key issues.   
C. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
The mixed method research design selected for this study provides maximum 
flexibility for data collection and analysis because both quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be used.  The following research strategies were evaluated for suitability and 
effectiveness as instruments for obtaining GCCS-M stakeholder feedback.   
1. Literature Review 
First, a preliminary literature review was performed to determine if stakeholder’s 
expectations were clearly and concisely conveyed in existing documentation.  Existing 
literature consisted of either broad DOD and Navy policy guidance or formal program 
documentation prepared by the program office to satisfy a statutory or regulatory 
requirement.  DOD and Navy policy guidance typically does not help the program 
manager establish priorities other than “it must be done,” or balance conflicting guidance. 
Many documents are more than two years old, and may not reflect current or future 
priorities.  Other documents define strategic objectives, but are so broad that actionable 
responses cannot be clearly identified.  Archived program documentation such as an 
Acquisition Plan or Operational Requirements Document typically focuses on addressing 
statutory and regulatory compliance in accordance with prescribed policy, and as such 
tends to document facts rather than expectations.   
Formal memorandums and presentation materials from reviews and meetings 
provide a major source of background information and guidance.  In the past, programs 
would archive paper copies of memorandums and briefings in a documentation library for 
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future reference.  In the age of electronic mail and Microsoft PowerPoint slides, routine 
communications are lost for future analysis unless someone can produce them from a 
Microsoft Outlook saved messages folder.  Fortunately, key GCCS-M electronic mail 
messages have been printed and placed in the program’s acquisition history binders.    
Preliminary analysis shows that available documentation provides the historical 
information necessary to identify stakeholders, identify questions to be asked of 
stakeholders, and understand the context of stakeholders’ comments.  The available 
documentation does not comprehensively and clearly articulate the current and future 
expectations of GCCS-M stakeholders.  When stakeholder intent is clearly stated in 
documentation, there are sometimes no corresponding quantitative measures to gauge a 
program’s performance towards meeting the intent.  Also, the program has experienced 
situations where the previously stated intent of a stakeholder was met without the 
stakeholder knowing it.  In order to get the information necessary to conduct strategic 
planning GCCS-M needs to elicit time-current inputs directly from the stakeholders in a 
participative process.   
2. Surveys 
Survey techniques were ruled out because GCCS-M’s stakeholders form a small, 
well-defined population.  In many cases there is only one knowledgeable individual who 
understands and can articulate the stakeholder organization’s perspective.  Furthermore, 
there is no set of sample data suitable for analysis by statistical methods.  Each 
stakeholder has a different perspective on GCCS-M that must be captured as to 
understand the complete stakeholder expectation picture.   
3. Questionnaires 
A questionnaire distributed via electronic mail or posted on a website is another 
way of eliciting feedback from stakeholders.  However there are several disadvantages to 
research approaches lacking real-time, face-to-face contact.  First, there is no opportunity 
to ask a follow up question without real-time interaction.  Since stakeholder input must 
be clear and actionable to be useful, the researcher must have the opportunity to elicit 
clarification on incomplete or contradictory statements.  Second, response rate to an 
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email or web-based questionnaire is likely to be below 100% participation.  Stakeholders 
are being targeted because they are known to have relationships with the program tied to 
specific positional roles and responsibilities.  The GAO recommends real-time, face-to-
face interviews when a poor response to questionnaires is anticipated (GAO, 1991).  
4. Focus Groups 
Focus groups provide face-to-face contact and are time-efficient because feedback 
from multiple stakeholders can be obtained simultaneously (GAO, 1991).  However it 
would be very difficult to bring all of the stakeholders associated with a DOD acquisition 
program together in one place.  In the DON acquisition process, there is no program 
event where secretariat level acquisition stakeholders meet with Fleet stakeholders 
beneath the level of CNO staff.  If such a meeting were to be scheduled, program office 
past experience indicates that principal stakeholders who establish and advocate 
organizational visions would be inclined to send staff instead of attending themselves.  
Since representatives of all key GCCS-M stakeholders have never met together there 
would be significant “forming”, “storming”, and “norming” phases (Tuckman, 1965) 
required before any useful input was obtained. 
5. Interviews 
Qualitative interviews provide an approach for answering the research questions 
in this study, since interviews ensure the participation of busy stakeholders and provide a 
forum for asking follow-up questions for clarification. 
The qualitative research interview seeks to describe and the meanings of 
central themes in the life world of the subjects.  The main task in 
interviewing is to understand the meaning of what the interviewees say. 
Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a 
participant’s experiences.  The interviewer can pursue in-depth 
information around the topic.  (Valenzuela, 2003, p. 2) 
This study can leverage an extensive body of prior research on qualitative 
interviews to identify suitable approaches and methods.  Four different approaches have 
been identified as tools to perform qualitative research interviews (Valenzuela, 2003). 
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• In an informal, conversational interview, no predetermined questions are 
asked in order to remain as open and adaptable as possible to the 
interviewee’s nature and priorities.  This approach provides maximum 
flexibility, but it does not yield structured results that can be readily compared 
and contrasted.  With limited time available for each interview, important 
topics might not be addressed without applying structure to the interview 
process. 
• The guided interview ensures that the same general areas of information are 
collected from each interviewee.  This approach provides more focus than the 
conversational interview, but still allows a degree of freedom and adaptability 
in getting information from the interviewee.  This approach also provides 
structure to manage a short-duration interview and creates groupings of 
stakeholder inputs that can be compared and contrasted. 
• In a standardized, open-ended interview the same open-ended questions are 
asked of all interviewees.  This approach facilitates data analysis and 
comparison while allowing interviewees the opportunity to explain their 
answers; however it does not provide flexibility to tailor the interview to the 
interviewee’s specific roles and responsibilities.   
• In a closed, fixed-response interview all interviewees are asked the same 
questions and choose answers from the same set of pre-determined 
alternatives.  This approach ensures uniform answers to questions, but 
provides no opportunity for the interviewee to explain why an alternative was 
selected. 
A combination of closed, fixed response questions and a guided interview offers 
the best way to answer the GCCS-M research questions.  A series of closed, fixed 
response questions can be asked early in the interview to identify the issues that are most 
important to the stakeholder.  The interviewer can use these responses to dynamically 
establish the interview agenda and prioritize the order of further questions.  In very short 
interviews, some lower priority questions might not be addressed before the allotted time 
is over.  The guided interview can be structured around key focus areas that are of 
concern to the program, such as capability, funding, support, and interoperability.  The 
literature review and environmental analysis in Chapter III examines topics and issues 
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that have been of interest to stakeholders in the past.  During the course of the interview, 
each stakeholder can be asked for expectations and suggestions for improvement in each 
focus area.  The guided interview approach provides a framework that enables the 
interviewer to ask follow-up questions if the stakeholder’s intent is not clear and 
actionable.  The guided interview approach further facilitates aggregation of stakeholder 
expectations by focus area.   
D. STAKEHODLER INTERVIEW DESIGN 
The interview research design focuses on defining a repeatable process that will 
ensure relevant, actionable input is obtained from very busy principal stakeholders.  This 
section develops the interview design, and describes planning necessary to ensure the 
right information is elicited from the right stakeholders.  Identification of the specific 
interviewees and the questions they are to be asked are contained in Part IV of this 
document. 
The GAO uses structured interviews “to audit and evaluate the programs, 
activities, and financial operations of federal departments and agencies and to make 
recommendations toward more efficient and effective operations” (GAO, 1991, p.6).  The 
GAO has published its process for conducting structured interviews, and this research 
will use the GAO’s guidelines as a basis for an interview methodology. The GAO 
identifies structured interviews as a beneficial method when essentially the same 
information must be obtained from numerous people.  The GAO structured interview 
process permits open-ended questions if they are presented in a structured, precise 
manner.  Their methodology discourages broad-based, open-ended questions when 
interviewee’s responses will be compared and contrasted.   
1. Interviewee Selection Methodology 
The first step towards identifying stakeholders will be to analyze the GCCS-M 
extended organization through a political lens.  The leaders of the organizations that 
influence the program will be selected as the interviewees.  Because GCCS-M and its 
predecessor systems have been deployed for over 15 years as the Navy’s core command 
and control capability, there are many senior leaders who have familiarity with GCCS-M.  
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In addition, GCCS-M is the Navy service component of the GCCS Family of Systems 
that provides the Joint, integrated command capability to Combatant Commanders.  As 
such, GCCS-M has significant visibility at the Department of Defense level as well as at 
the Navy level.   
Interviews will be scheduled with organization principals rather than staff when 
possible.  It is anticipated that most interviews will be conducted at the GS-15, O-6, or 
career Senior Executive Service level. 
2. Interview Question Design 
The GAO identifies three desirable attributes of appropriate interview questions 
that will be taken into account in the design (GAO, 1991): 
•  Relevance: Questions should be relevant to the study being conducted and 
should have a good probability of yielding data needed for the final report. 
Although this would seem obvious, evaluators sometimes go on “fishing 
expeditions” and want to include all sorts of variables that can create an 
unnecessary burden on the interviewee and distract attention from the central 
purpose of the interview. 
• Selection of respondents: Give preliminary consideration to which people can 
be expected to answer questions. A question may be relevant to a study, but 
the choice of persons to answer it may be inappropriate. 
• Ease of response: Interviews are meant to obtain data that may otherwise not 
be documented or, if documented, may need some interpretation. This 
includes opinions and feelings about the study topic. Questions should be 
relatively easy to answer and should not cause undue burden to the 
interviewee. 
Earlier, a mixed (closed end and guided) interview approach was identified as 
being appropriate to this research.  The first step is to define a standardized closed end 
question that will be asked in each focus area to determine an initial assessment of the 
stakeholder’s priorities and interests.  The GAO identifies several types of questions for 
use in structured interviews, including fill-in-the-blank, binary-choice, and scaled-
16 
response (GAO, 1991).  A scaled response question will be asked to determine the 
stakeholder’s assessment of GCCS-M performance in each focus area.  Pre-defined cues 
of “excellent”, “good”, “fair”, and “poor” will be used to generate a quantitative 
assessment of current program performance in each focus area.  Some focus areas will be 
of interest to all stakeholders, but others will be of more interest to stakeholders with 
specific responsibilities.  For this reason, the questionnaire will include a category called 
“no basis to rate”.  Interviewees deliberately will not be asked to rank-order the specific 
focus areas for importance because all are assumed to be important and necessary since 
they are derived from the environment analysis. 
The following figure summarizes the structure of the closed-end, scaled response 
question that will be asked for each focus area at the beginning of the interview. 
Focus Area 1 Excellent Good Fair Poor No Basis to Rate
Focus Area 2 Excellent Good Fair Poor No Basis to Rate
… … … … …
Focus Area n Excellent Good Fair Poor No Basis to Rate
Circle the rating that best describes GCCS-M’s 
current performance in each area.
…
 
Figure 1.   Closed-end, Scaled Response Question Design 
The next step is to design a question that will cause stakeholders to offer specific 
recommendations for improvement in GCCS-M.  Since inputs are to be used for strategic 
planning, the question must be focused to elicit strategic goals and expectations rather 
than tactical inputs associated with current, short-term issues the stakeholder is facing.  
The GAO offers the following example of how a broad, open-ended question can be re-
phrased as a focused question to provide a structured response (GAO, 1991, p.24): 
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• Broad Question:  “What happened to you while you were unemployed?” 
• Focused Question:  “How did you manage to pay your bills when you were 
unemployed?” 
Using this example of a focused question as a guide, the question to be asked of 
each GCCS-M stakeholder is “What should GCCS-M do differently in the future to 
achieve or maintain an “Excellent” rating?”   This focused question statement forces the 
interviewee to associate the response with specific actionable changes that are future 
focused, and forces the interviewee to address what they dislike about the status quo.  
When necessary, he interviewer will ask probing questions to encourage the interviewee 
to offer open and honest opinions and to clarify intent. 
3. Interviewee Indoctrination Brief 
The GAO emphasizes that informed consent is a critical component to the 
willingness of an interviewee to participate (GAO, 1991).  The GAO suggests discussing 
the types of questions to be asked and how the answers will be used when interviewees 
are first contacted, and again when meeting for the interview. 
A short indoctrination brief will be prepared to let the interviewees know why the 
interview is being conducted, and how the information will be used.  Because some 
interviews may last at little as 20 minutes, the target length of the indoctrination brief is 
under two minutes.  The interviewee will be told that the information gathered during the 
interview has two purposes.  First, the interview will obtain stakeholder inputs on the 
program’s performance that can be used in future strategic planning.  Second, data 
collected during the interviews will be analyzed and reported as part of this thesis.  
Interviewees will be informed that this research will be archived for public access by the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).  
The interviewee will be told which other stakeholders are being approached for 
interviews.  Finally, the interview methodology will be outlined at a high level. 
4. Interview Peer Review and Pre-Testing 
The GAO recommends expert review and pre-testing of the interview questions to 
ensure (GAO, 1991): 
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• The right questions are being asked to obtain the needed information. 
•  The contents of the question are relevant to the respondent, and the 
respondent has the information necessary to answer the questions. 
• The wording and procedures used in conducting the interview are adequate to 
ensure valid and relevant results. 
 The interview methodology, proposed stakeholders, indoctrination brief, and 
questions will be peer reviewed by no less than three knowledgeable personnel from the 
GCCS-M program office and PEO-C4I staff.  The comments of these reviewers will be 
incorporated into the final interview methodology and questions.  The reviewers will 
review the indoctrination brief, validate the focus areas, assess the quantitative ranking 
methodology, evaluate whether more targeted questions would be necessary to elicit 
constructive feedback, and evaluate the assessment methodology.  At least one dry run 
interview will be conducted for the interviewer to rehearse and to ensure the interview 
questions will elicit quality feedback in a short amount of time.   
5. Interview Session Design 
Appointments with members of the Senior Executive Service and other critical 
stakeholders can be hard to schedule due to travel, high demand for an individual’s time, 
and emergent issues that cause reschedules.  Flexibility will be required to accommodate 
last minute changes.   Interviews that require travel will be scheduled during a multiple 
day trip to accommodate rescheduling.  Interviews will be scheduled for 20 to 30 minute 
periods; however stakeholder schedule fluctuations sometimes result in appointments 
shorter than that.  The objective of the interview session design will be to derive usable 
input from a 20-minute interview.  Some stakeholders may be able to commit additional 
time that will ensure all of the focus areas are covered and allows additional probing 
questions to be asked. 
There are several alternatives for capturing data during the interview.  One 
approach is to have the interviewer take notes, however this is not preferred because the 
interviewer can become more focused on note-keeping than on the interview.  The 
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methodology for this interview permits the interviewer to ask follow-up questions, 
making it very difficult for the interviewer to simultaneously act as the recorder.    
A second approach is to have a third party recorder take notes during the 
interview.  The GCCS-M program office has a number of support contractors who are 
experienced meeting recorders.  Support contractors are also located in geographic areas 
where the interviewees are based.  Having a designated recorder permits the interviewer 
to focus on eliciting information from the stakeholder, but it is possible the recorder will 
not be able to maintain accurate notes if the interview is fast-paced.  Two recorders can 
work independently and merge their results to mitigate this risk.  Notes taken can be 
reviewed immediately after the interview to fill in any missing information.   
A third method is to record the interview using a voice recorder and then 
transcribe the interview into text.  A recorded interview ensures the exact words and aural 
cues of the interviewee are captured, however there is a risk that the recording device 
might malfunction.  The recorder should be checked several times during the interview to 
mitigate the risk of data loss. 
Recording the interview on a voice recorder is the preferred alternative because it 
provides an accurate, permanent artifact that can be recalled for future strategic planning 
requirements.  However, some stakeholders might not be comfortable with use of a 
recording device, and some interviews may occur in a government facility that restricts 
the use of recording devices.  A third-party recorder will be present at each scheduled 
interview in case the stakeholder does not want the interview recorded.  If the recorder is 
used, the recorder and the interviewer will review the interview notes immediately after 
its completion to improve accuracy and completeness. 
6. Data Analysis 
The design of the closed-end, scaled response questions and focused, guided 
response questions provides a natural structure for assembling and communicating the 
data gathered in the interviews.   
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a. Analysis of Closed-End, Scaled Responses 
The qualitative comments and recommendations provided by the GCCS-
M stakeholders are expected to provide inputs into the strategic planning process, but a 
secondary output of the quantitative assessments will be to determine the variability in 
how stakeholders view GCCS-M.  Although sample sets are too small to utilize 
quantitative statistical methods, the closed-end, scaled responses can be used to compare 
and contrast stakeholder perceptions about the program in each focus area.  Comparing 
how each stakeholder scores a given focus area can help the program learn if there is 
agreement on the program’s performance, or if certain stakeholders may have a different 
understanding of the GCCS-M environment than others.  Also, an analysis of focus area 
ranking relative to stakeholder responsibilities could help the program office understand 
overlaps and boundaries between stakeholder organizations.  Figure 2 shows examples of 
distributions that could result from tabulating stakeholder responses to the closed-end, 
scaled response questions. 








Figure 2.   Qualitative Interpretation of Scaled Response Results 
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In this example, the rankings in Focus Area A show a visible dominance 
towards “excellent” category.  It also shows that one or two individuals have a very 
different point of view than the rest.  It is important for the program manager to know 
why the outliers have evaluated GCCS-M differently.  Sample Focus Area B shows a 
situation where most of the stakeholder’s evaluate the program’s performance as “good” 
or ”fair”.  Focus Area C shows rankings distributed across the four categories, 
demonstrating a situation where there is a lot of variability in stakeholder sentiments.  
Because of the limited data sample set more rigorous statistical techniques are not 
appropriate.  A qualitative evaluation of the closed-end, scaled responses using the 
process described above provides sufficient information for the program office to proceed 
with strategic planning. 
b. Analysis of Guided Interview Responses 
Responses to the guided interview are anticipated to be the most beneficial 
stakeholder feedback because results are intended to be actionable.  The focus area-based 
structure of the interview will be retained for the presentation and analysis of interview 
results.  Grouping interviewee responses by focus area will enable the program to 















Figure 3.   Presentation of Guided Interview Results 
This methodology will identify when there is consensus among 
stakeholder expectations, and may possibly identify focus areas where stakeholders have 
conflicting expectations. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The first phase of this research has defined a repeatable process for eliciting 
stakeholder expectations.  This process ensures participation of stakeholders, yet is 
sensitive to demands on their time.  The mixed-method research design permits multiple 
techniques to be applied, including literature reviews, closed-form interviews, and guided 
interviews.  A preliminary literature review reveals that there is substantial background 
information available that can be used to identify stakeholders and interview questions.  
The chosen interview research methodology leverages lessons learned and recommended 
approaches from the GAO’s structured interview process.  The GAO’s interview process 
has been peer reviewed and applied extensively to obtain input structured inputs from 
interviewees.  Processes for peer reviewing and testing the interview technique, preparing 
an indoctrination brief, and conducting the interview have been established.  Finally, an 
approach for presenting and analyzing the information gathered from the stakeholders 
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III. GCCS-M LITERATURE REVIEW AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first step in the process of identifying and evaluating stakeholder expectations 
is to understand the environment GCCS-M operates in.  Although DOD 5000 (DOD, 
2003a, DOD 2003b) just recently identified evolutionary acquisition as the preferred 
acquisition strategy for a DOD system, the GCCS-M program and its predecessors have 
been using informal evolutionary acquisition for more than 15 years to develop and field 
the Navy’s core Command and Control capability.  Put another way, GCCS-M has been 
in concurrent development, fielding, and sustainment for over 15 years.   
Over this period, many of today’s stakeholders have had prior involvement with 
GCCS-M, possibly as a shipboard operator of the system, a more junior level manager or 
acquisition executive, or as an observer looking into GCCS-M from another organization.  
At the same time GCCS-M was evolving through the acquisition process, key stakeholder 
roles and responsibilities evolved in parallel with organizational policy and structure 
change within the DOD and Navy.  Each stakeholder’s statutory, regulatory, and 
organizational roles and responsibilities influence his or her concerns, motives, and 
expected outcomes.  The program office has had many noteworthy interactions with its 
stakeholders over the past 15 years that continue to impact perceptions about the 
program.  Different stakeholders have exerted varying degrees of influence over the 
program at a given time, but at almost all times there has been at least one significant 
external force driving the actions and reactions of the program manager.  A thorough 
review of program documentation, memorandums, acquisition decision memoranda, and 
other available records dating back to the beginnings of the program is necessary to 
understand the program’s current position from each stakeholder’s perspective.  
Fortunately, a large amount of the documentation required to perform this analysis is 
archived in the program’s acquisition library. 
The environmental analysis will contribute to this research in two ways.  First, the 
GCCS-M environment will be used to identify which stakeholders should be interviewed, 
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and what questions they should be asked.  Secondly, after the interviews are conducted 
the environment analysis will be used to understand the context of each stakeholder’s 
assessments and expectations given organizational roles and responsibilities. 
B. GCCS-M SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 
GCCS-M is the core Command and Control component of the Navy’s Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems. The system 
supplies information that aids Navy Commanders in a full range of tactical decisions. In 
functional terms, GCCS-M fuses, correlates, filters, and maintains raw data and displays 
image-building information as a tactical picture. Specifically, the system displays 
location of air, sea, and land units anywhere in the world and identifies whether those 
units represent friendly, neutral or enemy forces. It operates in near real-time and 
constantly updates unit positions and other situational awareness data. GCCS-M also 
records the data in appropriate databases, and maintains a history of the changes to those 
records.  The user can then use the data individually or in concert with other data to 
construct relevant tactical pictures, using maps, charts, map overlays, topography, 
oceanographic, meteorological, imagery and all-source intelligence information all 
coordinated into what is known as a Common Operational Picture. The picture is referred 
to as common because once constructed it can be shared with other Joint, Coalition, and 
Allied users who need the information. This information allows commanders to review 
and evaluate the general tactical situation, determine and plan actions and operations, 
direct forces, synchronize tactical operations, and integrate force maneuver with 
firepower. The system operates in a variety of environments and supports command and 
control of joint, coalition, and allied forces. 
GCCS-M is fielded today on 276 U. S. Navy ships, at 88 command centers and 
shore-based operational sites, 20 P-3 Tactical Support Centers, and 13 mobile command 
centers.  In addition the program has multiple Foreign Military Sales and collaborative 
international programs with allied and coalition partners who are using the capabilities of 
GCCS-M.  Because more operational sites are added each year and new capabilities are 
always in development, the program never achieves a traditional Full Operational 
Capability.  Since 1989, GCCS-M has been fielded on Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
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(COTS) hardware purchased from Sun Microsystems or Hewlett Packard.  GCCS-M was 
one of the earliest widely fielded software intensive systems, and as such has been at the 
forefront of resolving COTS supportability, lifecycle, and maintenance issues. 
C. GCCS-M STAKEHOLDERS 
The GCCS-M stakeholders are the individuals and groups who contribute 
important resources to the organization.  A first step towards understanding how GCCS-
M stakeholders influence the program is to acknowledge the concept of shared power. 
Power is shared in organizations; and it is shared out of necessity more 
than out of concern for principles of organizational development or 
participatory democracy.  Power is shared because no one person controls 
all of the desired activities in the organization. (Ancona, 1999, M-2 p. 40) 
Sharing power is a necessary part of any complex organization such as an 
acquisition program.  Frequently power must not only be shared, but there is a continuous 
struggle for power and control among individuals and groups with highly varied interests, 
goals, and motivations (Ancona, 1999).  Common sense assumes organizational leaders 
will make strategic, rational, and timely decisions in pursuit of the greater good for the 
Warfighter.  Unfortunately, in complex organizations key leaders with different 
organizational roles and responsibilities may not share the same goals and motivations.  
This could result in conflicting actions and duplicative efforts.  The political perspective 
views a complex organization through the relationships between stakeholders.  One way 
of modeling the political perspective across an organization is to create a stakeholder 
model, as is shown in the following figure for the GCCS-M program:   
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Figure 4.   GCCS-M Stakeholder Model 
The GCCS-M Stakeholder Model identifies four categories of stakeholders that 
influence the program:  Oversight, Fleet, Supplier, and Interfaces.  Analysis of interfaces 
internal to the program office will not be considered within the scope of this research. 
1. Oversight Stakeholders 
GCCS-M oversight stakeholders include senior DOD and DON executives who 
have statutory and regulatory oversight responsibilities, such as the Program Executive 
Officer for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Space 
(PEO-C4I & Space), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and 
Development (ASN(RDA)), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Network and Information Integration (ASD(NII)). Prior to 2003, ASD(NII) was known 
as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)).  
28 
a. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration 
ASD (NII) is the principal Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff 
assistant for the development, oversight, and integration of DOD policies and programs 
relating to the strategy of information superiority for the Department of Defense. 
ASD(NII) functions include information policy and information management, command 
and control, communications, counterintelligence, security, information assurance, 
information operations, space systems and space policy, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, and intelligence-related activities conducted by the Department. In 
addition, ASD(NII) serves as the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the Department of 
Defense (ASD(NII), 2003). 
GCCS-M is the designated Navy participant in the GCCS Family of 
Systems, which is comprised of GCCS-Joint and Air Force, Navy, and Army service 
GCCS programs.  The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and 
Information Integration) (OASD(NII)) chairs the Command, Control, Communications, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) Overarching Integrated Product 
Team (OIPT) and provides oversight of the GCCS Family of Systems programs.  
ASD(NII) has signed several Acquisition Decision Memorandums directed at GCCS-M, 
even though the Milestone Decision Authority is ASN(RDA).  The program conducts a 
yearly program review with the C3ISR OIPT to ensure compliance with statutory, 
regulatory, and architecture requirements and submits quarterly Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary (DAES) reports for OASD(NII) review.   The primary GCCS-M 
interface to the OASD(NII) is through the Army colonel assigned to the Family of 
Systems programs by the OIPT chair. 
b. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition 
ASN(RDA) is the Service Acquisition Executive within the Department of 
the Navy, and as such has the responsibilities granted to that position by the DOD 5000 
series (DOD, 2003a; DOD 2003b).  In summary, ASN(RDA) supervises the performance 
of the Defense Acquisition System within the Navy, and represents the DON before the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD(ATL) and 
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Congress on all matters related to acquisition policy and programs (SECNAV, 1995).  
ASN(RDA) is also the Navy Senior Procurement Executive and performs functions 
related to that role as designated by law, executive order, or regulation.  ASN(RDA) 
serves as the Milestone Decision Authority for all Navy programs, but can delegate that 
responsibility to a PEO.  As an ACAT-IAC program with OSD special interest, the 
Milestone Decision Authority for GCCS-M is not delegated beyond the Service 
Acquisition Executive.   
Most of GCCS-M’s involvement with ASN(RDA) is through the Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and 
Space) (DASN(C4I/EW/SPACE)). The DASN(C4I/EW/SPACE) mission is to be: 
The focal point in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASN(RDA)) for all matters 
pertaining to strategic, tactical and non-tactical command and control, 
communications, computers, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, space systems, related ancillary and support 
equipment, Information Resource Management (IRM), Information 
Technology (IT), and other matters as assigned. (ASN(RDA), 2003, p. 1) 
c. Program Executive Officer for C4I & Space 
As of November 1, 2002, GCCS-M and other acquisition programs at 
SPAWARSYSCOM were administratively realigned under the newly created PEO-C4I 
and Space.  According to the PEO, Mr. Dennis Bauman, there are three reasons why 
ASN(RDA) realigned SPAWARSYSCOM programs under a PEO structure: 
First, it focuses part of the organization specifically on acquisition, which 
improves efficiency and effectiveness. Secondly, it increases the 
interchange among the acquisition professionals at SPAWAR and other 
acquisition organizations within the Navy and other Services. This is 
significant because it facilitates a more cohesive joint acquisition 
community. Lastly, the change clarifies the authorities and reporting 
structure required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as well as some 
of the decisions made as a result of the Packard Commission Report of the 
late 1980s. Goldwater- Nichols and studies like the Packard Commission 
were part of the genesis and rationale for establishing the PEOs. (CHIPS, 
2003) 
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As an ACAT-IAC program, the Milestone Decision Authority for GCCS-
M resides with ASN(RDA) not the PEO.  However, the creation of the PEO has 
engendered an organizational focus on “providing effectiveness and efficiencies in the 
business of C4I acquisition” (CHIPS, 2003, p. 1) that had not previously existed.  The 
PEO is “empowered to act for and exercise the authority of ASN(RDA) to supervise 
directly the management of assigned programs, maintaining oversight of cost, schedule, 
and performance” (SECNAV, 1995, p. 8).  A PEO is also responsible for all aspects of 
life cycle management for its assigned programs.  Life cycle management is defined as 
“all management responsibilities for a program that encompasses acquisition, in-service 
support, and disposal” (cradle-to-grave support) (SECNAV, 1995, p.3). 
The GCCS-M program office is co-located with PEO-C4I and Space, and 
has frequent interaction with the PEO and staff.  The PEO reviews and approves all 
acquisition documents before they are forwarded up the acquisition chain of command, 
and provides technical and financial management guidance across the PEO.  The PEO is 
also the Source Selection Authority for GCCS-M contracts. 
d. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
For most of its history, GCCS-M reported to SPAWARSYSCOM for 
matters relating to both acquisition and execution year in-service support. As of 
November 1, 2002, the reporting chain changed such that GCCS-M reports to 
ASN(RDA) through PEO-C4I for matters relating to acquisition, and to CNO through 
PEO-C4I and then COMSPAWARSYSCOM in matters relating to execution year in-
service support (CHIPS, 2003).   SECNAV Instruction 5400.15A defines in-service 
support as “management and technical support provided between delivery to operational 
forces and final disposal, including maintenance, technical support, configuration 
management, and integrated logistics support” (SECNAV, 1995, p. 3). 
CNO has also designated SPAWARSYSCOM has also been designated as 
the C4I Chief Engineer of the Navy and the FORCEnet Chief Engineer (Randall, 2003).  
The following figure depicts the multiple additional duty relationships that exist as a 
result of this designation.  Reporting through NETWARCOM, SPAWAR is the technical 
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authority for FORCEnet.  As the C4I Chief Engineer of the Navy, SPAWAR reports to 
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Figure 5.   FORCEnet Chain of Command (From: Randall, 2003, p. 5) 
GCCS-M relies heavily on its relationship with SPAWAR since 
approximately half of the civilian and military personnel directly supporting the program 
office are matrixed from the systems command.  All programs under PEO-C4I rely on 
SPAWAR for comptroller, information technology, legal, contracting, and other support 
services. 
2. Fleet Stakeholders 
In broadest terms, Fleet customers are the men and women who use GCCS-M 
operationally across the Navy.  The GCCS-M program interacts daily with operational 
users through Fleet experimentation and demonstration events, operational test, system 
installation teams, mobile training teams, help desk support, schoolhouse support, 
deployed ship riders and operational site support teams, and symposiums where Fleet 
users have the opportunity to discuss GCCS-M directly with the program manager.  
There are tens of thousands of GCCS-M users at hundreds of commands across the 
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world.  The program does not interface directly with the Fleet for future capability needs 
and resource prioritization.  Instead, this interface is through stakeholders holding 
organizational responsibilities for requirements and resources.  The key stakeholders who 
represent the GCCS-M operational users include the program’s resource sponsor on the 
Chief of Naval Operations staff, requirements and policy officers at the Naval Network 
Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), and commanders at the Commander, U. S. Fleet 
Forces Command (CFFC). 
a. Chief of Naval Operations 
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has several key 
responsibilities in support of acquisition programs (SECNAV, 1995): 
• Serve as principal advisors to the Secretary of the Navy in the area of 
allocation of resources to meet program requirements in the programming and 
budget processes. 
• Coordinate the Test and Evaluation (T&E) Master Plan Process, and provide 
principal liaison with Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Forces 
(COMOPTEFVOR) on operational T&E requirements and execution. 
• Identify, validate, and prioritize the warfighting needs, resulting in an 
approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) or Capability Development 
Document (CDD).  Manage the requirements documentation process and 
liaison with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 
• Direct the efforts necessary to determine current and future requirements of 
the Navy for manpower, material, weapons, facilities, and Fleet support 
including the determination of quantities and military performance 
requirements. 
b. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command 
The Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) was established on 
October 1, 2001 by the CNO (CNO, 2001).  As directed by the CNO and with the goal of 
furthering Fleet-wide alignment, Commander, Atlantic Fleet, assumed the concurrent 
duties of CFFC with responsibilities for: 
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Coordinating, establishing, and implementing integrated requirements and 
policies for manning, equipping, and training Atlantic and Pacific Fleet 
units during the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).  The integrated 
policies and requirements coordinated by CFFC will result in standard 
Fleet-wide practices on both coasts.  The purpose of this initiative is to 
achieve greater unity of effort in fulfilling our Title 10 responsibilities to 
organize, train, and equip the United States Navy.  Alignment is critical to 
ensuring our Fleet, staffs, systems, and processes deliver a combat-capable 
Navy ready to sail in harm’s way.  The result will be a highly unified Fleet 
that, although deploying from different coasts, draws upon a shared and 
streamlined organization to complete the same training; executes common 
tactics, techniques, and procedures; and operates seamlessly around the 
world.  In short, alignment will allow us to more effectively achieve our 
primary mission:  victory in combat. (CNO, 2001, p. 1) 
Since CFFC was established, GCCS-M has had multiple program reviews, 
telephone calls, and electronic mail communications with CFFC senior staff.  In the role 
of Commander, Task Force Web, the CFFC N6 has established Fleet-initiated 
architectural guidance that acquisition programs are expected to adopt.  CFFC is also a 
high profile user of GCCS-M since GCCS-M supports CFFC’s Fleet-wide C2 mission. 
c. Naval Network Warfare Command 
The Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) was established 
on July 11, 2002 to perform three functions (Mayo, 2002): 
• In support of Commander, US Fleet Forces Command, organize, train and 
equip the Navy’s ships and Sailors to operate the information network and 
realize information technology’s full capability. 
• Support all Fleet commanders in the Navy – Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, 
Naval Forces Europe and Naval Forces Central Command – with the day-to-
day running of the global information network in support of Naval and Joint 
Commanders. 
• Integrate, assess and deliver the "full requirement" for Navy’s information 
technology, information operations and space requirements. 
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At the ceremony standing up NETWARCOM, VADM Richard Mayo 
made the following observations about the role he viewed the new command taking in the 
future of network-centric warfare: 
I will not forget the report of a returning battle group commander earlier 
this year to the Chief of Naval Operations. He was discussing the overall 
great success of his Sailors and ships in their deployment to the Indian 
Ocean in support of the global war on terrorism. He reported the 
"network-centric warfare worked, but that it was fragile." Changing and 
improving that assessment, in fact, will clearly be our mission at Naval 
Network Warfare Command. Today, too many possibilities of single point 
failures exist; too many non-standard configurations exist. We clearly 
need to make network-centric warfare capability more robust, especially 
against a capable adversary, and configured to a common standard. 
(Mayo, 2002, p. 1) 
3. Supplier Stakeholders 
Industry stakeholders are the defense contractors and Navy Working Capital 
Funded (NWCF) research labs that develop, integrate, test, and support the GCCS-M 
system.  Later parts of this paper will explain how GCCS-M evolved from many separate, 
smaller acquisition programs and projects that provided similar capabilities but were 
tailored to organizational or functional niches such as command centers, P-3 mission 
support, or ship scheduling.  As these multiple smaller programs and projects were 
brought into what eventually became GCCS-M, the program office retained the 
specialized development contracts associated with each niche.  In 1998, the program 
managed development and system integration tasks performed by the following NWCF 
activates and contractors:  SPAWAR System Center San Diego, SPAWAR System 
Center Charleston, International Research Institute (INRI), PRC, two autonomous groups 
at SAIC, FGM, PRB, DTAI, Motorola, APC, Autometric, and SEMCOR (NCCS, 1998).  
In effect, the GCCS-M program office was operating as the program integrator because it 
utilized an acquisition strategy with widely distributed performers.   
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By 2003, several major factors had influenced the collapse of this into a more 
manageable trio of Northrop Grumman and two NWCF activities (SPAWAR Systems 
Center Charleston and SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego).  First, Northrop Grumman 
bought INRI, PRC, and PRB creating a dominant development contractor for the first 
time in the program’s history.  After the buyouts occurred, the GCCS-M program 
encouraged Northrop Grumman to consolidate its many GCCS-M activities under a 
single management team.  Second, reprioritization of resources and requirements ended 
relationships with several other contractors. 
When working with industry, it is important to remember its motivations and 
limitations.  The objective of a business is to create value for its shareholders while 
maintaining a sound financial position (Anthony, 1999).  Profit and return on investment 
are widely accepted measures of value generation for a business. Market share has 
become another method of measuring a company’s performance in the competitive DOD 
marketplace.  Industry stakeholders negotiate contracts with the program office, but 
lobby Congress and influence political appointees and other key DOD executives on 
matters related to an acquisition program.  In addition to traditional defense contractors 
like Northrop Grumman, vendors who provide commercial products to the government 
for purchase, such as Microsoft and Oracle, are becoming increasingly visible on the 
political scene as the value of COTS purchases increases.   
Working with Navy Working Capital Fund activities is similar, although the 
business objective of NWCF organizations is to generate enough revenue to pay labor 
and operational costs (maintain a sound financial position) without creating value for 
shareholders.  As with industry, NWCF activities maintain close relationships with 
Congress particularly when Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) proceedings are 
underway.  A program manager can choose how much tasking goes to a NWCF activity, 
but as part of the organizational claimancy that includes the NWCF activities a program 
is a financial stakeholder.  NWCF labor rates can increase if resources are under-utilized. 
4. Interface Stakeholders 
GCCS-M has identified approximately 150 other acquisition programs and 
projects that it has management and engineering relations with.  In some cases, these 
relations simply involve occasional meetings between each program’s managers and 
engineers to discuss areas of common interest.  In more than 60 cases a one-way or bi-
directional information exchange occurs between GCCS-M and another system driven by 
a requirement in either program’s JROC validated requirements document.  Interface 
stakeholders are systems and capabilities developed by the Fleet, other Navy program 
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offices, and other services that exchange information with GCCS-M.  Several of the 
interfaces are mission critical, including the interface with the Tactical Tomahawk 
Weapons Control System (TTWCS).  Competition among program managers for scarce 
financial resources is keen; reuse of existing capabilities is widely recognized by program 
managers as one way to provide an affordable solution to a mission need. 
C. GCCS-M NOTEWORTHY EVENTS  
Having described the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in 
GCCS-M acquisition and in-service support, the next step is to describe the experiences 
and milestones those stakeholders have shared with the program. A review of program 
events and milestones over the past 15 years provides a basis for understanding the 
context for how today’s key stakeholders view GCCS-M.   
1. The Beginnings of Navy Command and Control Afloat 
The Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A) Decision Coordinating 
Paper (CNO, 1991) provides a history of the development of Navy C2 systems prior to 
1991.  As early as 1971, Tentative Specific Operational Requirement (TSOR) No. 31-
42T validated the initial requirement for the creation of Tactical Flag Command Center 
(TFCC) as a dedicated space in which the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) and 
Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) would fulfill their command and control 
responsibilities.  The 1980 TFCC Navy Decision Coordinating Paper (NDCP) provided 
for the phased development of TFCC.  Increment I provided for the design and 
installation of a dedicated Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)-capable space in 
selected afloat command platforms, including CV-, CVN-, LHA-, and LHD-class ships.  
Increment II added the Flag Data Display System (FDDS), which provided hardware and 
software for displays, decision support tools, and data correlation. 
On 3 August 1989, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering, 
and Systems (ASN(RE&S)) approved consolidation of TFCC, the Afloat Correlation 
System (ACS), and the Electronic Warfare Coordination Module (EWCM).  The 
ASN(RE&S) decision memorandum of 17 Aug 1989 directed incremental acquisition 
using the Joint Logistics Commanders Guidance on Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) as the 
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strategy for development.  The restructured system provides the basis for the NTCS-A 
baseline configuration, which was planned for installation in thirty-three CN-, CVN-, 
AGF-, LCC-, LHA-, and LHD-class ships, as well as five shore sites beginning in FY 
1990. 
Created as a Fleet initiative, the Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) 
provided a downsized tactical information transfer, display, and decision-aiding system.  
Under sponsorship of CINCLANTFLT, the Fleet CINCs prototyped JOTS using the 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf Navy Standard Desktop Tactical-Support Computer (DTC-1) 
to address deficiencies in processed wide area surveillance information, tactical decision 
aids, and C2 display functions not already being met by afloat and ashore C2 systems.  
Following transfer of development responsibilities to the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR), JOTS was converted to the DTC-2 COTS hardware 
using the UNIX operating system.  This aligned JOTS and NTCS-A on the same 
hardware and software operating environment baseline and JOTS was incorporated into 
NTCS-A.  The JOTS inventory objective included 255 cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 
auxiliaries, and amphibious ships.  These platforms combined with the 33 previously 
identified platforms comprise the NTCS-A inventory objective that remains today for 
GCCS-M afloat (along with the addition of submarines). 
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The NTCS-A evolutionary development strategy implemented required 
capabilities by reusing designs and technology previously developed for TFCC, ACS, 
EWCM, and other stand-alone systems such as the Prototype Ocean Surveillance 
Terminal (POST).  This approach integrated TFCC elements with other C4I systems and 
workstations to achieve a consolidated, interoperable architecture.  Continued rapid 
prototyping facilitated the infusion of enhanced capabilities to the baseline.  
Implementation of NTCS-A included a standardized human-machine interface, 
distributed access to databases, and on-going evaluation and development of additional 
capabilities in a systematic manner oriented toward expedient delivery of capabilities to 
the Fleet.  This rapid deployment was to be achieved through innovative acquisition 
streamlining with planned incremental upgrades to the operational baseline system 
emphasizing the use of non-developmental item (NDI) and COTS hardware and software 
applications.  No ACAT designation letter can be found in the program’s acquisition 
documentation library, however subsequent program documentation states that NTCS-A 
had been designated as an ACAT II program by ASN(RDA). (CNO, 1991) 
2. The Beginnings of Navy Command and Control Ashore 
At approximately the same time as NTCS-A and its predecessors were being 
developed, the Operations Support System (OSS) was developed as an integrated C2 
information management system to meet the command center support requirements of 
CNO and the Fleet Commanders-in-Chief (SPAWARSYSCOM, 1993).  OSS provided 
CNO and the Fleet Commanders-in-Chief with a single C2 system to receive, process, 
display, maintain, and assess unit characteristics, employment scheduling, materiel 
condition, combat readiness, Warfighting capabilities, and positional information.  As 
with NTCS-A, OSS was developed using the guidance of the Joint Logistics 
Commanders Guidance on Evolutionary Acquisition as the strategy for development.  
Because OSS was the first program to utilize this guidance, it was initially elevated from 
an ACAT III to an ACAT II program.  However, upon fielding an initial block of 
capability in 1992 it was reverted back to an ACAT III status because it did not meet 
ACAT II funding thresholds.  OSS was developed to utilize the same COTS hardware 
and software platform as NTCS-A, thereby leveraging a common architecture and 
hardware procurement contract.  This observation led to the combination of NTCS-A and 
OSS into the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS).   
Similar to CINCLANTFLT’s involvement in the development of JOTS, 
CINCPACFLT guided requirements definition, development, and fielding of OSS.   Fleet 
commanders at CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT became personally involved in the 
development of the C2 capabilities necessary to conduct operations, ensuring that these 
systems had significant operational utility and relevance.  An extreme indicator of the 
personal attention paid to these early Navy C2 systems is the “coincidence” that JOTS 
carries the initials of VADM Jerry O. Tuttle, who developed the initial JOTS capability at 
CINCLANTFLT.  VADM Tuttle served as the CNO resource sponsor for both NTCS-A 
and OSS at the time the 1991 coordination paper (CNO, 1991) was written.   
From their inception, GCCS-M and its predecessor systems have been at the 
leading edge of acquisition reform.  Non-Developmental and COTS hardware and 
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software were adopted long before these terms were widely used within the acquisition 
community.  Evolutionary acquisition was used by GCCS-M for more than a decade 
before it was formally defined by DOD and identified as the preferred acquisition 
strategy (DOD, 2003).   
3. Fleet Initiatives 
During the course of GCCS-M development, several other Fleet initiatives like 
JOTS have influenced the technical architecture of the program.  Examples of widely 
known Fleet-sponsored initiatives include IT-21, Task Force Web, and FORCEnet.  
Although these initiatives improve the usability and capability of GCCS-M, they are 
started and often finished before the program ORD is updated through the JROC 
requirements process.  Initiatives are initially funded through execution year re-
prioritization instead of the PPBS process, and scheduled for completion before a cost 
analysis can be performed and an update of the Acquisition Program Baseline can be 
approved by the Milestone Decision Authority.  The result of re-prioritization is that 
capabilities planned through the official requirements process and installations planned 
through the PPBS process are deferred.   
a. Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) 
As with JOTS and OSS, Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-
21) was initiated and guided by the Fleet.  The vision for IT-21 was first articulated in 
January, 1997 by ADM Archie Clemmins while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet: 
The goal of IT-21 is to link all U.S. forces and eventually even our allies 
together in a network that enables voice, video and data transmissions 
from a single desktop PC, allowing warfighters to exchange information 
that is classified or unclassified, and tactical or non-tactical. To do this, we 
must build a system to industry standards, using commercial off-the-shelf 
technology, devoid of stovepipes, in a client-server environment that 
allows the pull of just what information is needed in a way that's seamless 
to the user in the field. (Clemmins, 1997, p. 1) 
Although now 6 ½ years old and many underlying technologies have changed, the top 
level information architecture concept for how IT-21 was to enable net centric warfare 
remains valid, as depicted in the following figure: 
40 
 Figure 6.   IT-21 Information Architecture (From: Clemmins, 1997, p. 1) 
 
Since JMCIS and its predecessor systems were already fielded on every Navy ship, the 
JMCIS program immediately became the mechanism for purchasing and installing the 
computers and network equipment required to implement the IT-21 vision.  First 
generation personal computer and web-based C2 capabilities were delivered for 
Operational Test in January, 1998 (a year after ADM Clemmins announced IT-21).  
These personal computer and web-based capabilities were fielded with the JMCIS 98 
software version that was later renamed to GCCS-M 3.1.   
In June 1998, following successful completion of the JMCIS 98/GCCS-M 
3.1 operational test, the program office was split by COMSPAWARSYSCOM into two 
separate program offices.  The Navy Command and Control Systems program office 
remained focused on applications (including GCCS-M), and another program was 
established to focus on shipboard local area networks and general usage personal 
computers.  Since networks were previously part of GCCS-M funding and ORD 
requirements, this essentially descoped the program and created a critical programmatic 
interface between applications and networks that remains to this day. 
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Migration towards the the personal computer platform remains a major 
focus of GCCS-M.  An Operational Test (OT) of GCCS-M using entirely PC clients will 
occur in 2004.  Migration of server-based capabilities to the PC platform is planned to 
begin in 2005, however critical capabilities within GCCS-M that are actually funded and 
developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) (the Common Operating 
Environment (COE)) are not yet available on a  Microsoft Windows-based PC.  In the 
meantime, legacy equipment fielded before 2005 will likely be installed and supported 
for over a decade. 
b. Task Force Web 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) chartered Task Force Web (TF 
Web) on 3 April 2001 to lead the Navy’s web transition effort.  Prior to its charter from 
the CNO, TF Web was established as a Fleet initiative by the Commander in Chief, U. S. 
Atlantic Fleet.  The TF Web five-point mission is to: (Armistead, 2003) 
• Establish and maintain an architectural blueprint 
• Coordinate IT systems architectures 
• Provide recommendations to CNO on web-enablement technologies 
• Review Operational Requirements Documents and Mission Needs Statements 
for web-enablement 
• Assist SYSCOM and PEO organizations with prioritizing and migrating 
existing systems to the TF Web architecture. 
 TF Web was established to replace and consolidate dozens of websites 
that were being created throughout the Navy into an environment where “operational and 
business practices are connected worldwide via interconnected and interoperable web-
based IT systems” (Armistead, 2003, p. 10).   The method for achieving this is via an 
enterprise web portal such as provided by Yahoo or the Microsoft Network (MSN).  The 
portal aggregates and categorizes content, can be customized for specific job duties and 
personalized for individual needs, and provides a common look and feel. 
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As with IT-21, the GCCS-M program rapidly became a focus of attention 
of the primary TF Web stakeholder, the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) N6. 
Although GCCS-M had been developing and fielding web-enabled capabilities since 
1996, responding to the challenge from CNO and CFFC to integrate with the TF Web 
portal environment caused significant reprioritization and execution year re-planning.  
Commander, SPAWARSYSCOM asked GCCS-M and other programs to rally behind the 
CNO vision in order to demonstrate responsiveness to Fleet needs; however additional 
requirements were not added to the program’s ORD, budgeted through the PPBS process, 
analyzed for cost impact, or included in the acquisition baseline.  The needs of the Fleet 
moved significantly faster than the acquisition process, however GCCS-M successfully 
fielded an initial web enabled, portal-compliant capability less than a year after the TF 
Web initiative was announced. 
c. Sea Power 21:  FORCEnet 
Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, unveiled Sea Power 
21 the transformational vision for the United States Navy in 2002.  FORCEnet is defined 
by the CNO Strategic Studies Group as “the operational construct and architectural 
framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed 
combat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to 
land” (Mayo & Nathman, 2003).  NETWARCOM is chartered as the fleet agent and lead 
Type Commander (TYCOM) for FORCEnet (Mayo, 2003).   
Developing FORCEnet will involve designing and implementing a 
network architecture that includes standard joint protocols, common data 
packaging, seamless interoperability, and strengthened security. It requires 
identifying and prioritizing capability investments within and across joint, 
interagency, and international programs. Most importantly, it will 
emphasize people as the center of FORCEnet development, so that 
technological advances support increasingly rapid and accurate decision-
making.  
The goal of FORCEnet is to arm our forces with superior knowledge, 
leading to increased combat power. In pursuit of this goal, FORCEnet will 
provide a comprehensive network of sensors, analysis tools, and decision 
aids to support the full array of naval activities, from combat operations to 
logistics and personnel development. The focused, timely, and accurate 
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data delivered by FORCEnet will help leaders at every level by allowing 
them to draw on vast amounts of information and share the resultant 
understanding. This will increase the joint force's ability to synchronize 
activities throughout the battle space to achieve the greatest impact. (Mayo 
& Nathman, 2003, p. 1) 
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Figure 7.   FORCEnet Capabilities (From: Mayo, 2003, p. 2) 
As with other Fleet initiatives, GCCS-M has embraced FORCEnet to 
demonstrate responsiveness and has redirected program resources in support of the Sea 
Trial experimentation process envisioned by CNO in Sea Power 21.  Included in this 
capability are PC-based, web-enabled C2 applications with three-dimensional 
visualization of the Common Operational Picture.    
4. Statutory and Regulatory Compliance 
Although compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements should be 
straight-forward, for most of its 15-year history GCCS-M’s evolutionary acquisition 
strategy was not officially acknowledged by the DOD 5000 series as a legitimate 
acquisition approach.  With the 2003 version of the 5000 series documents (DOD, 2003a 
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& DOD, 2003b) the first clear guidance on evolutionary guidance has been established.  
GCCS-M is currently updating its acquisition strategy to conform to the latest regulatory 
guidance.  Through almost all of its history, GCCS-M has received conflicting guidance 
on whether it had to follow statutory and regulatory guidance for a Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS), including compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  
Within the past three years, the guidance from OASD(NII) and ASN(RDA) have become 
clear and unwavering – become compliant. 
a. MAIS Designation and MAISRC Oversight 
As early as 1993, ASD(C3I) designated OSS as an information system 
requiring the oversight of the Major Automated Information System Review Committee 
(MAISRC).  After a request from CNO to reconsider this decision (CNO, 1993), 
OASD(C3I) declared that “it seems inappropriate to require additional bureaucratic 
review by the MAISRC whose members are neither accountable nor responsible for this 
sound program” (ASD(C3I), 1993).   A similar series of events occurred in 1995 when 
OSS was again added to the MAISRC oversight list, and again a Navy request to remove 
OSS from MAISRC oversight was successful because OSS did not meet funding 
thresholds for MAISRC oversight (CNO, 1995).  ASD(C3I) did ask for the Navy to brief 
OSS and JMCIS to the MAISRC for evaluation as part of a broader review of the GCCS-
Joint program, and stated that OSS and JMCIS were in fact MAIS programs (ASD(C3I) 
1995).  In 1996, OASD(C3I) issued a memo stating that MAIS reporting was not required 
for JMCIS or OSS until such point as ASD(C3I) and the Navy came to agreement on an 
oversight strategy given that the Navy maintained oversight of the programs (ASD(C3I), 
1996).  In 1997, the Naval Information Systems Management Center issued a 
memorandum directing all budget submitting officers that ASD(C3I) had made the 
determination that “all command and control systems and resources previously exempted 
from Information Technology (MAIS) budget reporting are no longer exempt and should 
be reported (CNO, 1997).  Yet, in a 1999 memorandum OASD(C3I) identified JMCIS as 
a non-MAIS special interest program subject to component review not DOD oversight 
(ASD(C3I), 1999).   
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Concerns about MAIS designation and MAISRC oversight can be 
summed up by the following statements from a 1996 memo from Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM: 
I believe this will work against our acquisition streamlining initiatives, 
result in loss of program synergism, and loss of programmatic flexibility 
of the evolutionary acquisition process.  The increased level of oversight 
as a designated MAIS program will defeat the purpose of evolutionary 
acquisition (SPAWARSYSCOM, 1996, p. 1). 
 This argument is consistent with the defensive posture taken by the Navy in its other 
responses to ASD(C3I) (CNO, 1993; CNO, 1995).  The argument was generally accepted 
by ASD(C3I) until the waning days of the Clinton Administration when Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen began to enforce compliance with the letter and intent of the law 
bearing his name, the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996 (CCA, 1996). 
b. Navy ACAT II to ACAT IAC Transition 
On March 24, 1997 the GCCS-M program received a memorandum from 
ASN(RDA) delegating milestone decisoin authority for NTCS-A to Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM (ASN(RDA), 1998).  The delegation letter does not change the 
program’s designation from its previous designation as an ACAT II.  On 1 June 1998, the 
JMCIS program conducted an ACAT II Milestone IIID Review (its fourth MS III under 
evolutionary acquisition) with its Milestone Decision Authority as Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM (SPAWARSYSCOM, 1998).  At this review, the program was 
directed to change its name from JMCIS to GCCS-M, and to release GCCS-M version 
3.1 for Fleet usage.  This version of GCCS-M provided initial PC-based capabilities and 
shipboard local area networks in support of the IT-21 initiative, and provided the 
program’s earliest Y2K compliant release.  The Acquisiton Decision Memorandum also 
directed the program to start development of its next release, GCCS-M version 4.X, and 
stated that the next program review would be a Milestone IIIA.   
In early 2001, the PM became aware that GCCS-M was identified in the 
FY01 Defense Authorization Act as being an ACAT IAC program.  OASD(C3I) advised 
the program manager that GCCS-M  would become an ACAT IAC program as soon as 
ASD(C3I) signed an ACAT designation letter.  Concurrently, the Navy Operational Test 
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and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) completed an Operational Test (OT) of GCCS-M 
version 3.1.2.1.  OPTEVFOR issued a memorandum on 15 March 2001 stating that 
GCCS-M 3.1.2.1 is “operationally effective and operationally suitable, and recommended 
for Fleet release” (OPTEVFOR, 2001).  Commander, SPAWARSYSCOM was still 
officially designated as the Milestone Decision Authority and directed the program to 
convene a MS III review on 22 March 2001 (NCCS, 2001) to obtain his approval for 
release of GCCS-M 3.1.2.1.  A few hours before the review, Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM and DASN(C4I) held a phone call to discuss who had authority to 
release GCCS-M 3.1.2.1 given that the ACAT II delegation letter had not been revoked.  
The review proceeded against the wishes of DASN(C4I); however, upon arrival at the 
review, Commander, SPAWARSYSCOM realized that he wanted a MS IIIE review even 
though the 1998 ADM had directed that the next review would be a MS IIIA.  Ten 
minutes into the meeting the review was stopped due to Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM’s concerns over his inability to approve a MS IIIA and personal 
concerns about technical limitations of GCCS-M 3.1.2.1.   
The acquisition status of GCCS-M was formally determined on March 30, 
2001 when the ASD(C3I) signed a memo designating GCCS-M as an ACAT IAC Major 
Automated Information System (MAIS).  This memorandum further directed GCCS-M 
to: 
Comply with other acquisition management and documentation 
requirements for MAIS in DOD 5000 series guidance.  See particularly 
new sections … which implement the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) and 
related statutory requirements (ASD(C3I), 2001, p. 1). 
The memorandum did not specify a timeline for compliance.  The ASD(C3I) designation 
letter did not designate a new Milestone Decision Authority, so by default the ACAT 
IAC designation made the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) the MDA, who for 
the Navy is ASN(RDA).  During 2001, the ASN(RDA) position was vacant and the 
Principal Deputy (PDASN(RDA)) was empowered to act as the Milestone Decision 
Authority.  DASN(C4I) performed coordination duties for GCCS-M, but was not 
delegated authority to act as the Milestone Decision Authority.  Immediately after the 
canceled MS III review, the GCCS-M program office began discussions with 
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DASN(C4I) over how to proceed with release approval for GCCS-M 3.1.2.1 and 
compliance with DOD 5000 and Clinger-Cohen requirements.  DASN(C4I) took the 
position that the program had to achieve statutory and regulatory compliance in order to 
obtain release of GCCS-M 3.1.2.1. 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the GCCS-M program 
manager increased the urgency of negotiations with DASN(C4I) over Fleet release of 
GCCS-M 3.1.2.1.  The program manager and Commander, SPAWARSYSCOM argued 
that the enhanced capabilities of GCCS-M 3.1.2.1 would improve Joint interoperability 
during an anticipated military response against terrorist actors.  Commander, 
SPAWARSYSCOM elevated the release decision of GCCS-M 3.1.2.1 to the 
PDASN(RDA), and got electronic mail approval from PDASN(RDA) to proceed with the 
Fleet release of GCCS-M.  On 05 October 2001, the PDASN(RDA) officially gave 
permission to release GCCS-M version 3.1.2.1 for Fleet usage, giving direction to 
achieve full statutory and regulatory compliance in the next release (ASN(RDA), 2001).   
Complicating this decision was a move to make GCCS-M an ACAT-ID 
program with additional oversight by USD(AT&L).  During the summer of 2001, GCCS-
M was added to a draft list of programs to be designated as an ACAT ID.  However, this 
list was never made final and there was no further discussion.  The May, 2003 5000 
series guidance (DOD, 2003a and DOD, 2003b) established the Information Technology 
Advisory Board (ITAB) to replace the MAISRC that had been eliminated by previous 
5000 rewrites.  The ITAB permits MAIS programs to receive equivalent OSD-level 
visibility as Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) have under the Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB). 
c. GCCS Family of Systems 
On January 24, 2002 OASD(C3I) convened a meeting of the Command, 
Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Space 
Systems Overarching Integrated Product Team (C3ISR & Space OIPT) to review the 
progress each member of the GCCS Family of Systems was making towards “completion 
of standard acquisition analysis and documentation requirements” (ASD(C3I), 2002).  
The program was directed to: 
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Progress toward completion of acquisition analysis and documentation for 
the entire program while continuing to develop, integrate and field 
software needed by Service and Joint Warfighters.  I approve a phased 
completion of analysis and documentation in accordance with the plans 
presented to the OIPT.  Each GCCS program must have completed 
analysis and documentation that covers the program block for which 
milestone approval is sought. (ASD(C3I), 2002, p. 2) 
GCCS-M was directed to present analysis and documentation for its current block 
(GCCS-M 4.X) at a Program Review during 4th Quarter FY2002 and complete program 
analysis and documentation at a Program Review in FY04. 
d. Achieving Statutory and Regulatory Compliance 
During 2002, almost a decade after ASD(C3I) inquiries on MAISRC 
review and MAIS designation began, GCCS-M tackled statutory and regulatory 
compliance.  A Program Lifecycle Cost Estimate (PLCCE), an updated Single 
Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP), an updated Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB), and a Clinger-Cohen Act Certification package were prepared in preparation for 
the ASD(C3I)-directed OIPT Program Review scheduled for 15 September, 2002.  The 
Program Lifecycle Cost Estimate (PLCCE) and the CCA certification package were 
independently reviewed and approved by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) 
prior to the program review.  The SAMP combines an Acquisition Strategy Report 
(ASR), Program Protection Plan (PPP), Risk Management Plan (RMP), and other 
regulatory documentation into a single document.   An Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB) was also prepared.  GCCS-M submitted current acquisition documents to 
DASN(C4I) for approval and signature.  As of the 2002 Program Review, GCCS-M was 
fully compliant with all statutory and regulatory requirements for the 4.X block except 
for lacking a JROC-validated requirements document and a C4I Support Plan (that had 
been waived at an OIPT meeting).  The program’s existing ORD was approved by the 
Navy in 1999, but was not validated by the JROC. 
5. Architecture Compliance 
In addition to Fleet-initiated architectures such as IT-21, TF Web, and FORCEnet, 
DOD has established the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) as its architectural 
framework for achieving Joint interoperability through the adoption of standards (DOD, 
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1996).  Adoption of DOD-wide enterprise information technology architecture is also a 
statutory requirement of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (CCA, 1996).  As information 
technology continues to evolve, DOD has updated its standards and is currently 
developing a network centric architecture called the Global Information Grid (GIG) 
Enterprise Services. 
a. Common Operating Environment 
As previously discussed, a common hardware platform and operating 
system was identified for JOTS, OSS, POST, and other legacy C2 systems as a way to 
enhance interoperability.  Concurrently, the observation was made that certain functions, 
such as mapping, track management, and communications interfaces, are fundamentally 
required for virtually every C4I system.  The Navy appeared to be spending a lot of 
money developing duplicative capabilities from scratch for each system.  Even though 
these systems had many similarities, they could not interoperate with each other since 
each developer used a proprietary way of presenting information on a map and 
communicating to external data sources.  As JOTS, OSS, POST and other legacy systems 
were integrated into NTCS-A, their respective C2 capabilities were re-architected to 
utilize a set of common C2 services for mapping, track management, and shipboard 
communication interfaces.  The result of these observations was the beginnings of the 
Common Operating Environment (COE) (formerly known as the Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII) COE).   
In 1993, the former Navy Command and Control Systems Program 
Manager transferred to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), who was in the 
process of building a replacement for the World-Wide Military Command and Control 
System (WWMCCS) (AdaIC, 1997).  Global Command and Control System-Joint 
(GCCS-J), which replaced WWMCCS, is built upon an open architecture that both meets 
the DOD's unique functional needs (the GCCS-J systems architecture) and provides for 
interoperability with other systems (the COE technical architecture). The open, technical 
architecture first developed for NTCS-A was enhanced to provide a similar open, 
technical architecture for GCCS-J.  Later, the architectural framework was unbundled 
from GCCS-J and provided the baseline for the COE.  
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The COE was incorporated into Version 1.0 of the Joint Technical 
Architecture in August, 1996 (DOD, 1996).  Because NTCS-A and JMCIS utilized the 
core services of UB, migration to the COE was more straightforward for the Navy than 
other services.  At the June, 1998 GCCS-M Milestone IIID Review the program’s name 
was changed from JMCIS to GCCS-M because the program had successfully adopted the 
COE architecture (SPAWARSYSCOM, 1998).   
The COE concept has significantly improve interoperability between C4I 
systems, as witnessed by the fact that many capabilities developed for one service C4I 
system are now fielded by other services.  However, managing cost, schedule, and 
performance dependencies with COE have posed a challenge for GCCS-M and other 
programs because the COE is a project, not a program.  The COE has no Milestone 
Decision Authority, no appropriated budget, no approved cost and schedule baseline, and 
no acquisition oversight outside DISA even though it is a key component of the Joint 
Technical Architecture.  Between 2000 and 2002 GCCS-M adjusted its cost and schedule 
baseline several times because capabilities planned in the COE (such as fully functional 
PC clients) were delayed.  Using the logic that ACAT IAM and ACAT IAC programs 
couldn’t meet to cost and schedule if they were critically dependent upon a non-program 
without a budget like the COE, the C3ISR OIPT and ASD(NII) obtained Congressional 
approval to create a new start program in FY 2004 called Network Centric Enterprise 
Services (NCES). 
b. Future C4I Architecture 
OASD(NII) defines net centricity as “a transformation enabler that 
empowers all users on the network with the ability to easily discover, access, integrate, 
and fuse data and services that support their mission objectives” (Krieger, 2003, p. 2).  
For decades, the model for information sharing between Warfighters has been “Task, 
Process, Evaluate, and Disseminate” (TPED).  Under the net centricity paradigm, the 
Warfighter waiting to disseminate information until after it has been analyzed unwittingly 
slows the speed of command and applies an analytical bias to information that might 
influence how others view or use the results.  ASD(NII) advocates switching to the 
“Task, Post, Process, and Use” (TPPU) model for information sharing to facilitate 
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storage, management and protection of information resources for warriors, policy makers, 
and support personnel (Krieger, 2003).  NCES is defined as a fast-track concept that 
transitions programs from the COE-based client-server architecture used by commercial 
industry in the 1980’s to the enterprise services architecture used by commercial industry 
today.  NCES provides:   
A common set of net-centric, interoperable information capabilities across 
the Global Information Grid. These capabilities include on-demand access, 
collection, processing, storage, dissemination, and management of 
information to warfighters, policy-makers, and support personnel. 
Information producers will be able to publish their products in an 
environment that facilitates consumer discovery, retrieval, and utility. 
Information consumers will be able to publicize their information needs 
and then be notified when the required information becomes available. 
(DISA, 2003, p. 1) 
The following figure illustrates today’s challenges of exchanging 
information in a net-centric environment.  Consumers of data may not know the data they 
need is available, may not be able to access it because of organizational or technical 
barriers, or may have the data but simply not understand it.  Simultaneously, producers of 
data do not know who needs to access their data, what problems they might be having 
accessing it, and what new capability could be gained if the right person had the right 
information. 
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 Figure 8.   Net Centric Data Strategy (From: Krieger, 2003, p. 8) 
Following the GCCS-M OT in 2004, the OASD(NII)-led C4ISR OIPT has 
directed GCCS-M to proceed with a transition to NCES and Joint Command and Control 
(JC2) based capabilities (ASD(C3I), 2002).  The mission need for JC2 is defined as 
follows: 
The Joint Command and Control (JC2) capability will be the Department 
of Defense (DOD) principal command and control system.  The JC2 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) describes the Joint C2 
requirements of the National Military Command System (NMCS), Joint 
Force Commanders (JFC) , and the Joint Planning and Execution 
Community (JPEC).  Guided by overarching strategic direction (e.g. 
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Joint Vision, 
Defense Planning Guidance, Chairman's Joint Concept of Operations), 
JC2 will provide agile C2 capabilities allowing joint forces to achieve a 
tempo of operations, decision-making, and command that adversaries 
cannot match.  JC2 will enable decision superiority via advanced 
collaborative information sharing achieved through vertical/horizontal 
joint C2 interoperability.  Transformation to future warfighting 
capabilities requires enhanced battlespace awareness, timely information 
exchange, and net-centric forces to support critical joint and multinational 
operations. (JC2 ORD, 2003, p. 1) 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a thorough review of the GCCS-M stakeholder 
environment, including organizational roles and responsibilities and historical 
relationships with the GCCS-M program office.  Four categories of GCCS-M 
stakeholders (acquisition oversight, Fleet, contractor, and interface) have been identified 
from which interviewees will be selected.  The statutory, regulatory, and organizational 
roles and responsibilities assigned to each stakeholder have been identified as they relate 
to the GGCS-M program.  More than fifteen years of program history have been 
reviewed to identify issues that are important to GCCS-M’s stakeholders.  Understanding 
GCCS-M’s relationship with stakeholders during this time period provides insight into 
their current and future expectations.   
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IV. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The environmental analysis of Chapter III was used to identify interviewees 
whose inputs would be valuable to GCCS-M.  Focus areas also emerged from the 
environmental analysis and show areas that interest stakeholders.  Interviews were 
scheduled and conducted using the process outlined in Chapter II.  Following the 
interviews, data was collected and tabulated in two ways.  First, the assessment scores 
assigned by all stakeholders in a given focus area were compared to determine if there is 
a consistent view among all stakeholders or if assessments vary by role.  Second, the 
expectations of each stakeholder were extracted from the interview and listed together to 
identify common themes. 
B. SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES 
Based on the environmental analysis in the previous section, the following 
stakeholders were selected as interviewees.  The list of interviewees was peer reviewed 
by the current GCCS-M program manager, deputy program manager, and a former chief 
engineer. 
Organization Sub-Organization Position
PEO C4I & SPACE  Principal
PEO C4I & SPACE Technical Director
PEO C4I & SPACE Navy Cryptologic Systems Program Office
PM, Deputy PM, 
Engineer
CNO Command and Control Division GCCS-M Resource Officer
CFFC N66 Principal
ASD(NII) C3ISR OIPT Action Officer
SPAWAR Systems 
Center San Diego




Northrop Grumman Information Technology Program Manager  
Table 1 Stakeholder Interviewees 
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C. FOCUS AREAS 
The environmental analysis also reveals recurring focus areas.  The list of focus 
areas was identified by identifying common themes contained in program and open 
source documentation.  The focus areas were peer reviewed by the current GCCS-M 
program manager, deputy program manager, and a former chief engineer.  The following 
nine focus areas were identified: 
• Operational Capability – Degree to which the capability provided by GCCS-
M matches the warfighting need; ORD requirements are effectively 
implemented. 
• Operational Support – Degree to which the GCCS-M program is responsive to 
the needs of the warfighter using the system, and provides the necessary level 
of Fleet support required to maintain and operate the system. 
• Shipboard Systems Interoperability – Degree to which GCCS-M facilitates the 
completion of the Joint and Navy warfighter’s mission by providing 
interoperability between the C2 network and shipboard emitters, weapons, 
sensors, and communications links such as Tomahawk, Aegis, Joint Fires 
Network, and cryptologic applications. 
• Joint/Coalition Interoperability – Degree to which GCCS-M facilitates C2 
interoperability between the Joint, Coalition, and Allied forces commander 
and assigned naval forces through information exchange with GCCS-Joint, 
other service C2 systems, and NATO systems. 
• Return on Investment – Degree to which GCCS-M provides warfighting value 
relative to the total lifecycle investment (including development, installation, 
fielding, training, manning, operations, and mission completion). 
• Technology Adoption – Degree to which GCCS-M has leveraged and 
incorporated emergent technologies, including commercial information 
technology products and capabilities demonstrated through DOD technology  
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insertion processes such as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE), Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and Future Naval Capabilities 
(FNC). 
• Architecture Compliance – Degree to which GCCS-M complies with Navy 
and DOD-wide architectural standards and initiatives, including the COE, IT-
21, TF Web, NCES, FORCEnet, and Collaboration at Sea. 
• Statutory and Regulatory Compliance – Degree to which GCCS-M complies 
with statutory and regulatory requirements such as Title 10, DOD 5000 series, 
and the Clinger-Cohen Act. 
• Program Planning and Resourcing – Degree to which GCCS-M has 
successfully defined and structured an acquisition program that is costed, 
budgeted, and resourced to meet stated operational requirements. 
The structured response feedback form that will be completed by the interviewee 
at the beginning of the interview is contained in Appendix A.  An indoctrination brief 
was prepared to introduce interviewees to the research study’s objectives and 
methodology in order to obtain informed consent for the interview.  The indoctrination 
brief was also peer reviewed by the current GCCS-M program manager, deputy program 
manager, and former chief engineer.  The indoctrination brief used at the start of each 
interview is included in Appendix B.   
D. RESULTS 
The following tables summarize the results of the stakeholder interviews.  One 
interviewee asked that positions and organizations not be associated with responses to the 
interview questions, so the following steps have been taken to preserve anonymity. 
• Scaled response questions are identified by the primary role of the 
stakeholder, not by the individual’s job or organization. 




A B C A B A B A
1 Operational Capability 3 2 0 2 3 3 2 3
2 Operational Support 2 2 0 4 4 2 4 3
3 Shipboard Systems Interoperability 3 2 0 4 3 4 3 2
4 Joint/Coalition Interoperability 3 3 3 1 3 2 2 0
5 Return on Investment 2 1 3 2 3 4 3 3
6 Technology Adoption 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3
7 Architecture Compliance 4 3 0 3 0 4 4 3
8 Statutory & Regulatory Compliance 3 0 2 4 0 2 0 0
9 Program Planning & Resourcing 2 1 3 1 1 1 0 0





Table 2 Structured Response Results 
 
 
Excellent Good Fair Poor
1 Operational Capability 7 88% 2.6 0 4 3 0
2 Operational Support 7 88% 3.0 3 1 3 0
3 Shipboard Systems Interoperability 7 88% 3.0 2 3 2 0
4 Joint/Coalition Interoperability 7 88% 2.4 0 4 2 1
5 Return on Investment 8 100% 2.6 1 4 2 1
6 Technology Adoption 8 100% 2.4 0 3 5 0
7 Architecture Compliance 6 75% 3.5 3 3 0 0
8 Statutory & Regulatory Compliance 4 50% 2.8 1 1 2 0










Table 3 Focus Area Statistical Summarization 
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The following analysis summarizes the interview results by focus area.  Scaled 
response results are analyzed using the methodology established in Chapter II.  Detailed 
interviewee comments are included in Appendix C. 
1. Operational Capability 
• Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around good to fair, with no excellent 
or poor ratings. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Most stakeholders believe that the capabilities 
defined in the GCCS-M ORD are too broad and that the program has tried 
to be everything to every person instead of focusing on C2.  However, 
several stakeholders felt that C2 needs better definition and GCCS-M 
needs to help the Fleet figure out how to use C2 capabilities effectively.  
Stakeholders believe the program should go back to its roots, and send 
teams of developers out on ships to understand the jobs sailors perform as 
was done in the early days of JOTS.   
2. Operational Support 
• Scaled Response Results:  About half rated excellent and the other half 
rated fair. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders believe the program does the best 
it can with limited resources.  Some stakeholders believe the program 
should aggressively pursue reliability and maintainability fixes while 
others believe the program may better serve the Fleet by “helping the Fleet 
help itself” by improving training materials.  Most stakeholders agree that 
the Fleet does not know how to use the capabilities of GCCS-M, and that 
this situation will get worse before it gets better as the amount of 
information available in C2 systems increases.  Some stakeholders do not 
believe the Fleet knows how it wants to use all of the information 
available in a net centric environment, and believe the program needs to 
help the Fleet figure out its requirements.  Some stakeholders believe the 
program is too quick to respond to the Fleet, but others believe there is no 
such thing as being too responsive. 
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3. Shipboard Systems Interoperability 
• Scaled Response Results:  Widely distributed between excellent and fair. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders agree that there are a lot of 
shipboard interfaces, but some do not believe the information exchanged 
in these interfaces is being effectively utilized.  Other stakeholders believe 
that GCCS-M has done a good job of exchanging information with other 
systems, but needs to move beyond interfaces to information integration 
and knowledge management. 
4. Joint/Coalition Interoperability 
•  Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around good to fair. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders had many different opinions 
about Joint interoperability.  Some felt the program needed to improve 
vertical integration with the Joint common operational picture by better 
leveraging the existing data available from shipboard sensors.  Others felt 
that the program needed to improve horizontal integration by developing 
the capability to share information directly with forces from other services 
(the way Navy forces share information today).  Still others felt that the 
real problem is cross-domain solutions that will enable information 
exchanges between security domains. 
5. Return on Investment 
• Scaled Response Results:  Broad distribution, but with over 50% 
specifying good.  
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• Guided Interview Results:  This focus area is the broadest of the nine, and 
stakeholders interpreted it in many ways.  Several stakeholders felt that 
GCCS-M has provided a lot of capability for a relatively small amount of 
money compared to other programs, and felt that C2 systems were ready 
to go in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  Other 
stakeholders are concerned that most of the GCCS-M investment over the 
past five years is hidden from capabilities users actually see as they use 
GCCS-M (in areas like architecture or infrastructure).  Stakeholders 
believe GCCS-M 4.X has been in development too long, however they 
understand the program was directed by its previous MDA to follow that 
course of action.  Several stakeholders requested improve cost 
performance metrics. 
6. Technology Adoption 
• Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around good to fair. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders believe the program has tried to 
adopt new technologies, but is challenged by having to move a large 
existing sustained base forward to any next generation technologies.  
Some stakeholders feel that the Fleet is not able to train and use new 
technology faster, while others believe that new capabilities should be 
made available more frequently.  Some stakeholders do not believe 
GCCS-M has a embraced new technologies generated through the Navy 
research and development process. 
7. Architecture Compliance 
• Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around excellent to good. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders feel that the program has done a 
good job keeping up with the COE, IT-21, and other enterprise 
architectures, but are divided as to whether too much focus was put on 
architecture at the expense of capability.  Some stakeholders believe that 
by putting architecture ahead of capability GCCS-M has emerged as one 
of the most interoperable systems in the Navy, while others believe that 
the program put too much emphasis on adopting new architectures before 
they were mature and money would have been better spent on capabilities 
seen by the Warfighter. 
8. Statutory & Regulatory Compliance 
• Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around good to fair. 
• Guided Interview Results:  Stakeholders feel the program has improved its 
statutory and regulatory compliance significantly since its ACAT IAC 
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designation, but that it still needs a JROC validated requirements 
document to be completely compliant. 
9. Program Planning & Resourcing 
• Scaled Response Results:  Clustered around poor 
• Guided Interview Results:  Planning and resourcing emerged throughout 
most interviews as one of the main areas GCCS-M needs to improve upon.  
Stakeholders do not believe the program is fully resourced to meet its 
requirements, and want the program office to work to obtain additional 
resources by building Fleet stakeholder support for the program and more 
effective utilization of the PPBS process.  The program office, CNO, 
CFFC, and NETWARCOM should be more closely partnered in planning 
activities.  Stakeholders say the program should stress its mission 
criticality, role in support of multiple mission areas, interoperability, and 
Fleet-wide installation footprint during the budgeting process. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The GCCS-M stakeholder interviews have yielded a wealth of information that 
can be used to improve the capabilities, management, and planning of GCCS-M.  
Although the initial focus of the interviews was eliciting suggestions for improvement, 
feedback on what stakeholders believe has gone wrong in the past proved almost as 
valuable.  For these inputs, further analysis will be performed to determine future courses 
of action that avoid past problems.  Analysis of the scaled response questions and the 
guided interview results show that there are some areas where stakeholders agree on 
courses of action (such as funding and shipboard interoperability), while there are other 
areas like Joint interoperability and operational support where widely varied approaches 
are suggested by different stakeholders.  Both types of feedback are extremely valuable to 





This research identified a process for eliciting stakeholder expectations, 
performed an environmental analysis of the GCCS-M program based on existing 
literature, and approached key stakeholders to obtain their assessment of the program’s 
performance and expectations for the future.  Its purpose was to obtain actionable 
stakeholder feedback that can be used in future strategic planning activities and 
acquisition planning.  This research should yield benefits to the GCCS-M program for 
years to come as planning documents are updated, however the program will need to be 
constantly vigilant for changing Warfighter needs. 
A mixed-methods research design consisting of literature reviews and focused, 
qualitative research interviews was selected as the best way to gain insightful input from 
stakeholders while providing enough structure to compare and contrast results during 
data analysis.  Two types of research interview approaches were used:  structured, closed 
response and guided.  This combination of approaches ensured that interviews were 
focused on the research problem (obtaining stakeholder feedback), but offered flexibility 
for the interviewer to ask probing questions when interviewee responses needed more 
clarity, strategic focus, or action-orientation.  A detailed process for conducting 
stakeholder interviews was defined, establishing objectives for the interview duration, 
location, and format.  Interview pre-briefing materials were generated to obtain 
stakeholder buy-in to the interview.   
Interviewees and interview focus areas were identified based on a thorough 
environmental analysis of the program.  Stakeholder organizational roles and 
responsibilities were identified and discussed in the context of GCCS-M.  The historical 
relationship between GCCS-M and its stakeholders was thoroughly documented using 
memorandums and other artifacts from the program’s acquisition library as well as 
briefings, policy documents, Naval messages, and publications.  The literature review 
provided a good definition of the program’s history and current state, but did not yield 
clear and actionable direction for future planning.  The environmental analysis validated 
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the starting premise of this research, namely that GCCS-M stakeholders should be 
approached to elicit their expectations.  Before any interviews were conducted, the 
interview approach, briefing materials, questions, and interviewees were peer reviewed 
by a group of three senior managers familiar with GCCS-M.   
A total of eight stakeholder interviews were conducted.  All stakeholders 
approached for interviews were supportive of participating in GCCS-M strategic 
planning, and offered very valuable insights into their expectations for GCCS-M.  Several 
stakeholders stated they were pleasantly surprised at being approached for inputs.  
Several interviews lasted as long as an hour because the stakeholder had great interest in 
GCCS-M, and had many good ideas for improvements.  In some cases, stakeholders had 
clearly articulated future expectations.  In other cases, stakeholders had concerns about 
past performance, but could not articulate specifics about what the program needed to do 
to improve performance.  In these cases, the program will need to perform a root-cause 
analysis of the problems identified by the interviews, and propose improvement plans to 
the stakeholders. 
The interview results show several focus areas where stakeholder assessments and 
expectations are closely aligned, however the interviews revealed several areas where 
stakeholders lack consensus on the management and technical approaches GCCS-M 
should pursue.  Reconciliation of these differences would provide greater constancy of 
purpose and program stability, and should be a high priority for the GCCS-M program 
office. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
During the course of this research, several lessons learned were identified that are 
useful to keep in mind when eliciting strategy-focused input from stakeholders and 
performing environmental analysis.  Most importantly, representatives of stakeholder 
organizations selected for strategy-focused interviews need to be comfortable discussing 
strategic concepts.  In cases where the organization’s principal leader cannot be accessed 
directly, a staff member who fully understands the leader’s strategy and is empowered to 
represent the organization’s interests can also provide valuable feedback.  Informed and 
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empowered interviewees made the comment that they enjoyed the interview session, and 
looked forward to seeing their inputs impact the program.   
This research would have been much more difficult without access to the GCCS-
M Acquisition Library that contains many of the documents referenced in the 
environmental analysis.  Today, most program documents are transmitted and received 
electronically in their original form, and some are even auto-generated and reported 
through an online database or web page.   Critical program documentation (including 
electronic mail messages that give direction or communicate guidance) need to be stored 
more permanently than in the recipients electronic mail archive or on the originator’s 
website.   
When preparing for interviews, significant thought needs to be put into the 
structure and methodology as well as selection of questions and interviewees.  The choice 
of methodology and interview structure can have significant impact on the quality of data 
obtained during the interview.  For example, one member of the interview peer review 
team recommended elimination of a neutral scaled response cue (“neutral”) between 
“good” and “poor” to prevent interviewees from “walking the middle of the road”.  
During the interviews several interviewees made the comment that they thought their 
response was in the middle between “good” and “fair”.  However, further discussions 
during the guided interview caused the interviewee to go back and definitively pick one 
of the existing scaled response cues.  Forcing the interviewee to decide between “good” 
and “fair” without offering a “neutral” assessment encouraged the critical thought 
processes and improved the usability of the results. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This research provided information that helps GCCS-M answer the research 
questions.  Stakeholder assessments of current program performance were obtained and 
expectations for the future were captured.  Interviewees offered many strategically 
focused suggestions and opinions about GCCS-M’s current and future performance, 
including process and cultural changes.  Stakeholders did not offer many suggestions for 
reprioritizing current efforts or quantitatively measuring performance, instead focusing 
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on the need to better plan and resource the program through the requirements, budget, 
and acquisition processes.  The feedback presented in Appendix C indicates that the right 
stakeholders were interviewed, the right questions were asked, and that the research 
methodology successfully elicited quality results.  In addition to the original research 
goals, face-to-face time with stakeholders helped establish closer relationships and 
demonstrates GCCS-M is committed to a collaborative planning process.  Obtaining 
future-focused stakeholder strategic inputs will help GCCS-M avoid disruptive execution 
year re-planning and facilitates providing quality inputs into the requirements, budgeting, 
acquisition processes. 
D. SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research provided an application of a structured, qualitative research 
interview to the GCCS-M program to obtain inputs for strategic planning.  The following 
topics are areas that should be considered for future research. 
• Evaluate the methodology used in this thesis for applicability to another 
acquisition program.  The interview process, organizational roles and 
responsibilities, and possibly even focus areas may be applicable beyond 
GCCS-M.  The methodology used in this thesis could assist other programs 
that desire structured and focused input from stakeholders. 
• Analyze “lessons learned” from evolutionary acquisition early adopters to 
show how programs are balancing new capabilities and lifecycle support.  
There are other programs besides GCCS-M that have been using evolutionary 
acquisition strategies since the 1980s.  Many of these programs are software 
intensive programs that have successfully fielded incremental capabilities, but 
are have done so by following “build-to-budget” finance strategies versus 
more stable and defendable “fund to requirements” strategies.  Areas where 
useful lessons learned exist include balancing funding for development of new 
capabilities and support; Fleet initiatives; statutory and regulatory compliance; 
COTS adoption; and architecture compliance.  These lessons learned could 
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benefit many other programs now that DOD 5000 has identified evolutionary 
acquisition as the preferred approach. 
• Explore ways to synthesize comments from the hands-on, operational 
users into strategic plans.  The interviews in this thesis are focused at the 
SES, O-6, and GS-15 equivalent level who are representatives of the actual 
officer and enlisted personnel using GCCS-M to perform Warfighting 
missions.  This research assumed interviewees had a larger perspective of 
cost, schedule, performance, requirements, supportability, future military 
needs, processes, and future Naval vision than many shipboard C2 leaders 
have.  Within the commercial and military product development disciplines 
there are many widely published methodologies for eliciting customer needs 
and synthesizing the results into a requirements document.  This is a difficult 
task, but it is even more difficult to synthesize inputs from an operational user 
into an acquisition strategy, contracting strategy, architecture, or technology 
road map. 
Eliciting constructive criticism from stakeholders can be an intimidating process, 
particularly when prior knowledge suggests that stakeholders believe there is room for 
improvement.  GCCS-M is a highly successful acquisition program fielded broadly 
across the Department of Navy, but even successful programs must continuously improve 
as mission needs and technologies evolve.  The GCCS-M stakeholders appreciated their 
role in the strategic planning process, and demonstrated their willingness to participate by 
offering candid, objective, and deliberative responses revealing new perspectives on old 
problems.  It turns out that the toughest critics provided the most insightful and valuable 
suggestions for improvement.  Upon reviewing this thesis, the GCCS-M program 
manager declared that it will be mandatory reading for all staff prior to the program’s 
next quarterly strategic planning offsite.  The results of this research enable GCCS-M to 
better meet its primary mission:  Provide the most effective and efficient C2 solution 

























APPENDIX A:  INTERVIEW STRUCTURED RESPONSE 
QUESTIONS 
DIRECTIONS:  Circle the answer that best reflects how you feel GCCS-M is 
performing in each area.  If you do not have sufficient information to make a choice, 
mark “No Basis to Rate.” 
• Operational Capability – Degree to which the capability provided by GCCS-M 
matches the warfighting need; ORD requirements are effectively implemented. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Operational Support – Degree to which the GCCS-M program is responsive to the 
needs of the warfighter using the system, and provides the necessary level of Fleet 
support required to maintain and operate the system. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Shipboard Systems Interoperability – Degree to which GCCS-M facilitates the 
completion of the Joint and Navy warfighter’s mission by providing interoperability 
between the C2 network and shipboard emitters, weapons, sensors, and 
communications links such as Tomahawk, Aegis, Joint Fires Network, and 
Cryptologic applications. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Joint/Coalition Interoperability – Degree to which GCCS-M facilitates C2 
interoperability between the Joint, Coalition, and Allied forces commander and 
assigned naval forces through information exchange with GCCS-Joint, other service 
C2 systems, and NATO systems. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
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• Return on Investment – Degree to which GCCS-M provides warfighting value 
relative to the total lifecycle investment (including development, installation, fielding, 
training, manning, operations, and mission completion). 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Technology Adoption – Degree to which GCCS-M has leveraged and incorporated 
emergent technologies, including commercial information technology products and 
capabilities demonstrated through DOD technology insertion processes such as Fleet 
Battle Experiments (FBE), Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) 
and Future Naval Capabilities (FNC). 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Architecture Compliance – Degree to which GCCS-M complies with Navy and 
DOD-wide architectural standards and initiatives, including the COE, IT-21, TF Web, 
NCES, FORCEnet, and Collaboration at Sea. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Statutory and Regulatory Compliance – Degree to which GCCS-M complies with 
statutory and regulatory requirements such as Title 10, DOD 5000 series, and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
 
• Program Planning and Resourcing – Degree to which GCCS-M has successfully 
defined and structured an acquisition program that is costed, budgeted, and resourced 
to meet stated operational requirements. 
 Excellent Good  Fair  Poor  No Basis to Rate 
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APPENDIX B:  INTERVIEW INDOCTRINATION BRIEF 
Overview
• Objective:
– Interview Key GCCS-M Stakeholders to Obtain Expectations & 
Ideas
– Look for Common Ground Among Stakeholders
• Apply Same Methodology, Same Questions
• Uses of Data:
– GCCS-M Strategic Planning & Resource Prioritization
– Thesis Research 
• Who is Being Interviewed?
– PEO, CNO, CFFC, NETWARCOM, CPF, SPAWAR, ASD(NII), 
DASN(C4I), Fleet, PACOM, JFCOM, Industry, Other PMO
 
Interview Approach
• Step 1:  Methodology Identification
– Nine Focus Areas
• Step 2:  Quantitative Assessment
– Evaluate Performance in Each Focus Area
• Understood Not All Stakeholders Track Every Area
– Rating Scale:  Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor, No Basis
• Step 3:  Qualitative Elaboration
– Stakeholder Ideas for Improvement, Re-Prioritization, Strategic 
Redirection, or Cultural Change.
– Discuss Lowest Assessments First in Interest of Time
– Again, Please Look Beyond “Do More with Less”
• Status Quo – If You Like The Results, We Can Stop Now!
Program Planning & ResourcingTechnology AdoptionShipboard Interoperability
Statutory & Regulatory ComplianceReturn on InvestmentOperational Support
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APPENDIX C:  INTERVIEW GUIDED QUESTION RESPONSES 
A. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
• “Due to all kinds of external circumstances we focused a lot of resources 
on getting to version 4.X, and getting into the next generation COE build 
long before it was ready.  A lot of the focus on Fleet issues like accuracy, 
timeliness, and reliability got pushed to the side in favor of keeping up 
with the Joneses.  I think this had a major detriment to GCCS-M in terms 
of its tactical relevance.  I think we are beginning to recover, but it is 
slow.” 
• “At the Seventh Fleet N6 Conference, the COP got a significant amount of 
good press.” 
• “We’re not going out to the users saying what did you like, what did you 
not like, how can we fix it.  Until we do that, we’re not going to be in the 
good to excellent category.” 
• “We need to focus on management of the tactical picture.  We were the 
only service focused on tactical management before 4.X, but we got 
refocused on making 4.X work several years ago.  No one else picked up 
the tactical picture management, it just went away, and the Fleet has 
noticed.” 
• “There are some capabilities we field that do not get used.  We continue to 
spend money fielding them.  The Fleet hardly uses JMHS except for a few 
ships and shore sites.  For the most part the Fleet is using Fleet SIPRNET 
Messaging or just plain Exchange and settling for the search capabilities 
available in those tools.” 
• “The TDAMS report shows a lot of tools in the COE Maritime that are 
hardly ever used, such as Screen Kilo and Four Whiskey.  C2WC and 
EWCS fall into that category also.” 
• “The Fleet has said we need CONOPS for chat room management, but 
what we really need to do is figure out what is happening inside chat 
rooms and build tools that capture that work flow.  Any workflow tool 
needs to be collaborative.” 
• “Given the way GCCS-M came about, from JOTS, the operational 
capability originally was excellent because it was driven by some very 
bright people who had recent operational knowledge and they were able to 
make the system very relevant to how business was done back in the late 
1980’s. As we progress towards the future, the way we do business is 
very, very different.  The whole concept is managing your actions through 
the analysis of information and trying to get inside the OODA loop to be a 
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  faster decision maker.  I don’t believe there are very skilled individuals 
 available yet who have the hands-on experience required to build a system 
 that works this way.” 
• “I don’t think the current 1999 ORD accurately reflects the Warfighter’s 
needs.” 
• “The program is stretched too thin.  The program tried to be everything to 
everybody, and what it really needed to do was be a C2 system.  But you 
can define almost everything to be C2.  We need to define and focus on 
what is really C2.  The program has gotten very big and has many 
dependencies that must be managed.  We need to say no sometimes.” 
• “The Fleet is floundering when it comes to information management.  
They are getting too much information out of C2 systems, and they don’t 
know what to do with it.  However, they won’t know what they are 
looking for to solve the problem until they find it.  It is hard to build a 
system to those needs.  It is incumbent upon the GCCS-M program office 
to help the Fleet figure out what they want.” 
• “Knowledge management is a key contributor to how GCCS-M will be 
used in the future.  You can’t build a system until you understand how you 
want the data to flow, and how people are going to use it.  Knowledge 
management is so new that the Fleet doesn’t know how to take advantage 
of it.” 
• “I don’t think anyone thought chat rooms would be as big as they are.  
They are changing the culture.  Sitting down and looking at the workflow, 
and how the data moves through systems, helps the Fleet understand how 
information flows.  This helps define the CONOPS, and helps the program 
office build a capability that better reflects the operational need.  We need 
to send analysts out to ride ships, watch the information flow, and figure 
out what it is used for.” 
• “For the most part, we can build on top of the capability as it is delivered 
to us.  There are some areas like HITS and message profiling that have not 
always worked smoothly.” 
• “Maybe we ought to have an N3 Conference, instead of an N6 
Conference.” 
• “People are not fully using the capabilities.  Maybe it’s too hard, not 
intuitive, or we don’t have enough training, or it’s just not sexy enough.  
Maybe it’s like Microsoft Word. I only use 20% of the capability and I 
know there’s a lot more that I would just never take the time to learn.” 
• “I hope computer based training, which we are starting to put in place 
now, will help people run through operational scenarios and demonstrate 
the full capability, so they will use it.” 
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• “In the early days, we could have a CCB one day, get it through the 
developer and the test labs, and have capability out to the Fleet in a week.  
We had a process, but it was fast.  Now we have to go through so many 
chains of coordination with the COE, testing, and oversight.  We’ve lost 
the speed to capability.” 
• “The core competency of GCCS-M should be C2, but I think that core 
competency has become diluted with other capabilities.  A lot of bells and 
whistles have been added on.” 
• “The ability to turn a new capability out rapidly has been lost.” 
• “There is a frustration that it takes too long to get new capability out.  
When we ask the users for input, they aren’t motivated to submit 
improvements because they feel they won’t see the outcome during their 
career.  We still need to maintain operational effectiveness while we put 
out new capabilities, so we have to balance speed with support.” 
• “We have added a lot of tools into GCCS-M.  When Admiral Clark was 
here, and we would go out to ships, I was amazed at his functional 
knowledge of the system.  He would start grilling the operators on whether 
they used specific tactical decision aids.  They were turning gray because 
they didn’t know as much as he did.” 
• “The systems have to be intuitive to use.  GCCS-M tried to solve world 
hunger, because people asked you to do that.” 
B. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 
• “The incident on USS Enterprise during OEF where we had difficulty 
tracking down the reason for a failure concerns me.  Given the importance 
of GCCS-M in OIF, we should not be limited by the number of tracks.  
We may not have stressed the system in a situation similar to Enterprise 
since the problems occurred there (or experienced the right circumstances 
that would cause the problems to be duplicated).  I think the concerns 
about the Enterprise problem are broader than more than one or two 
people.” 
• “Need to figure out a way to make the system more robust” 
• “May need to do more testing in a test environment that is representative 
of how we are operationally stressing the system. During surge warfare 
there are 3 to 5 battle groups in a geographic area at a moment’s notice.  
We do not test that way.” 
• “It is painfully obvious when we haven’t met the goal, and we get 
CASREPs from the Fleet”. 
• “There are some people who are trained and know how to make GCCS-M 
work, but there are many others who don’t find it useful for a variety of 
reasons.” 
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• “The real Fleet users have been relying on our FSETs and surge support 
from our training teams.  We’re stretched pretty thin on resources, but I’m 
not sure we are leveraging our training resources properly.” 
• “The crews on the ships are not well trained.  There are all kinds of 
reasons for that.  Can we consolidate the training money to really support 
the Warfighter through something like an augmented FSET team?  JFN 
has been very successful using this approach.” 
• “Given the Navy-wide footprint of the system, and given the resources 
applied, the response to problems is very good.  From an industrial 
perspective it is fair or poor because if this were an industrial concern you 
would charge directly for the maintenance, and you could be extremely 
responsive (for a price).  The whole architecture of the Navy system does 
not allow that.  Between the various fiefdoms of who is supposed to 
maintain and support, and the slow moving process to change that, and the 
pervasiveness of IT, and who pays for what; it’s fractured.” 
• “As we move forward in a Joint DOD environment where we do work in 
the information world, there has to be the recognition that Command and 
Control is going to be something more than people do in their spare time.  
That has to influence the career path of people who are in harm’s way.  
The same model that applies to understanding how the shipboard missile 
system works needs to be applied, which means that an officer’s career 
repetitively puts him or her through an update of knowledge about the 
missile/fire control work flow.  Something like this has to happen for C2, 
and it is not.  People get one hour of C2 at department head school.  The 
tactical application of C2 has to match a career path through the various 
stages of professional development.  If this gets imbedded in the social 
fabric, then operational support will take on the same quality as it does 
today for combat systems.  The support needs to be more closely 
embedded at the waterfront.” 
• “There will be fewer sailors involved in the future.  The mechanisms by 
which SSA’s and ISEA’s function are going to need to be focused and 
streamlined.  Competition and duplication between field activities needs to 
be eliminated.  I do not know how to do this in the NWCF/DBOF 
environment.” 
• “GCCS-M is almost too responsive to the Fleet.  When the Fleet squeaks, 
the threshold for tolerance within the program office is very low.  The 
program is very proactive at trying to meet the Fleet needs, but money is 
an issue.” 
• “As soon as the Fleet squeaks, people think they need to send someone 
out, fix something, or update software.  I think our first response should be 
to investigate a non-material solution.  The program’s attitude is that you 
need to take care of it internally.  Instead, the thought process should be 
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“What can we do to help the Fleet help themselves?”   That is not the first 
approach GCCS-M takes.” 
• “When there is a problem, this program has done a fantastic job at pulling 
the resources together to fix the problem in a short amount of time.” 
• “The warfighter is our customer; we can never be too responsive.” 
• “The scale does not go high enough to evaluate the operational support.  It 
has been phenomenal, between FCTCLANT and SPAWAR.  There is 
always someone ready to go out and help the Fleet.  I have been here 15 
years, and it has never been better.” 
• “The consolidated installation process has resulted in a situation where no 
one is in charge.  I want to be able to hold the program manager 
accountable.” 
• “The integrated install is a good thing for the ship, but in terms of bottom 
line dollars no programs I know of have had costs decrease.   I don’t know 
if the consolidated install is worth the cost, because I have never seen an 
actual cost reported.  Before, I knew every cost down to the penny.  I can’t 
get that anymore.” 
• “We should get everyone who does LAN installs (for example) together, 
and put out an installation specification, and have them come back in a 
week and bid against each other for the work.  We would still use best 
value, but there are multiple companies out there who are qualified to do 
the work and do a good job.” 
• “If costs are running higher than plan, I need to know that in January not 
in August.  By then its too late to make changes and re-prioritize.” 
C. SHIPBOARD SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY 
• “GCCS-M is caught in an identity crisis since the Fleet is still struggling 
with how to use the tactical picture.  We have interoperability with a lot of 
systems, but we have a hard time pulling it all together.  I find it ironic that 
the Joint Fires Network interfaces better with CDL than GCCS-M.  CDL 
and GCCS-M are in the same command!  Hardly anyone working in 
GCCS-M knows how to connect to that sensor, and what types of data 
could be obtained.”   
• “GCCS-M is the jack-of-all-trades, but the master of none.  We have good 
interoperability because we talk to all these sensors.  I can’t think of any 
system that has more connections to shipboard systems than GCCS-M.  
From that perspective we are excellent.  But is it a good interface?  Is the 
other side of the interface honored?  The quality and usage of interfaces 
needs to be worked.” 
• “When I look at the GCCS architecture on platforms, there are very few 
systems in the Navy that are as interoperable as GCCS-M.  There has been 
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no recognition from Navy leadership that we have already achieved most 
of FORCEnet with existing PMW 157, PMW 189, and ADNS projects.  I 
would have that as one of the poster children of leveraging 
interoperability.  Good solid engineers went out and made it happen.  The 
only reason we’ve accomplished what we have today is because of the 
GCCS-M infrastructure.” 
• “I think the 3.X series was based on interoperability between systems.  
The program achieved the goal of getting stovepiped systems to talk with 
each other.  But that is not enough now, they have raised the bar.  The goal 
line has moved to the point where systems don’t just need to talk with 
each other, they have to work together.  We still have work to do to take 
that next step.  There are features in 4.X that will help build integrated 
capabilities.” 
• “The synchronization of the track picture between security enclaves needs 
to be improved.  Users do not trust the system to correctly bring the COP 
onto the high side.” 
• “Some of the interfaces are manual, requiring operator intervention.  We 
need to try to automate those.” 
• “It’s very difficult to maintain all the interfaces when everyone around 
you is changing them.  The COE is making changes, and the other systems 
are making changes.” 
• “I think we could partner with systems a little better to build a more 
integrated C4I solution for the Warfighter.  There is a lot of finger-
pointing that goes on between NAVSEA and SPAWAR over who is 
responsible for supporting interfaces, or fixing them when they break.  
This applies to testing of these interfaces, as well” 
• “Real time systems fundamentally do not like to connect to a non-real-
time system.  Overcoming the near-real-time perception continues to be a 
tough sell to the weapons grid.” 
• “I killed the system of systems interoperability test because every problem 
identified in these tests was identified in the original system-level SOVT.  
Every single one.  I was paying twice for the same test.  The ships love the 
system SOVT test because they get more training.  There are 
knowledgeable guys who come aboard and the ship can pick their brains.  
I knew I was potentially shooting myself in the foot, but we just can’t pay 
for the same test twice.” 
• “The capabilities of ADSI were supposed to be integrated into GCCS-M 
in 1997 or 1998.  It was never resourced, but at this point we’ve the Fleet 
has bought ADSI boxes for just about everyone who needs it.  There are 
several other examples.” 
• “Our concern on interoperability is whether LANT and PAC ships can 
leave their respective home ports, meet up in the Indian Ocean, and ensure 
78 
that we are still interoperable.  There are so many different versions of so 
many systems out there; it is a nightmare to keep them straight and 
understand what works together.  Maintaining backward interoperability is 
key.” 
• “The combat systems have had six ships fail to make deployment because 
systems were not ready; SPAWAR has never done that with the C4I 
capability.” 
D. JOINT/COALITION INTEROPERABILITY 
• “The perceived need is to focus on horizontal interoperability (e.g. Navy 
unit to Army unit) vice vertical interoperability that we have done 
reasonably well at to date.  However, the requirement for horizontal 
interoperability needs to be better articulated.” 
• “Navy/coalition interoperability agreements have been beneficial.” 
• “The main issue here is that we need to get our shipboard data into the 
Joint C2 system to show the value of GCCS-M.” 
• “I don’t think anyone knows what C2 means in a coalition environment 
yet.  What does the operator really want to do in this environment?” 
• “The main issue is cross-domain solutions.  All we have is a guard and a 
serial connection on the coalition side.  The reason VCNO is concerned 
about cross-domain solutions is because he has four computers under his 
desk.  He wants to know why those computers have to be separate.  We 
still need UNCLASS, SECRET, TS, and coalition computers.” 
• “We have not done a good job at implementing MLS solutions.” 
• “There is more activity and focus on the Joint solution than ever before, 
due to MID 912 and JFCOM involvement.” 
E. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
• “We spend a lot of money on GCCS-M, and I don’t see a whole lot of 
stuff coming out the door on the product line.” 
• “Since the year 2000 we’ve had two releases.  That’s a lot of people and a 
lot of dollars.  We’ve waited a lot of years for 4.X.  I’m worried about 
somebody doing the ROI calculation on GCCS-M, and asking the question 
why aren’t we getting more rapid technology insertion and new 
functionality for the investment.” 
• “I need cost performance data on GCCS-M to ensure that the program is 
operating efficiently and effectively.” 
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• “Across the Family of Systems, the benefit gained for a relatively small 
investment has been substantial.  I don’t think we consume huge dollars to 
get the capability.” 
• “ROI is capability based, not economic.  The question that must be 
answered is can the Warfighter plan, execute, decide, and detect in a more 
efficient manner because of the tools.  This needs to take quality and 
timeliness into account.  It is much more subjective than bending metal at 
the shipyard.” 
• “We spent a lot of money fixing a product that wasn’t ready for prime 
time, and didn’t spend money making a product that was prime time.  
How many millions of dollars did we spend migrating to 4.X?” 
• “It’s hard to figure out where the C2 system ends, and the supporting 
infrastructure takes over.” 
• “I remember what had to be done to prepare the Navy for Operation 
Desert Storm, and I compare that to what had to be done for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom this time around.  It seems to me the overall job this time 
was harder, because we went at it alone. Yet for C2 it was essentially sail 
away and go.  Our fielded C2 capabilities were as modern as they could 
be; things weren’t sitting on the shelf waiting to get out there.  The fact 
that people could take the installed product and do the job makes the 
return on investment excellent.  For Desert Storm, an unbelievable 
industrial surge occurred to prepare forces to perform C2.  For OIF, it was 
transparent; it just happened.” 
• “Requirements and needs are changing more rapidly than the investment 
process.  You could be much more responsive without the hurdles 
imposed by the testing and acquisition processes, but that’s the 
environment GCCS-M is in.” 
• “Over the past couple of years, most of the money has been sunk into 
future capabilities like 4.X or infrastructure changes like COP Sync Tools.  
In the eyes of the Fleet, not a whole lot has changed.  The capability seen 
by most users has not changed.  The changes have been significant, but 
invisible to most users.” 
• “Operators and officers don’t know what the system can do; they do not 
know its capabilities.  There is a major training issue out there for the 
leadership, not just the system operators.  I’m afraid that people are going 
to use the 4.X system the same way that they use 3.X today, and that the 
investment we’ve made in 4.X will be lost.” 
• “We need to train the officers better, not just on the tools but how to do 
C2.  The operators are just going to do what the leadership wants.  Very 
few operators will go above and beyond, and look for new ways to use the 
system.  They will just provide what they are asked for.  We train the 
operators well, but the leadership doesn’t understand what the system is 
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capable of.  We need to focus on the O-3 through O-5 level officers who 
define the information requirements.   
• “It is going to fall on the program office to facilitate the environment 
where the Fleet defines an enterprise C2 process.  NETWARCOM, 2nd 
Fleet, and 7th Fleet should participate.  The N3’s need to be involved.  The 
Navy is the only service where the N6’s get involved in C2 requirements.” 
• “We no longer have to develop things ourselves that are in the COE or 
GCCS-M.” 
• “We probably could have done things cheaper or better in retrospect, but 
given where we started from in the late 1980’s we have come a long way, 
and have spent a lot less money than a lot of other programs that I think 
have been less successful.” 
• “From a command ship and carrier perspective, there is no doubt in my 
mind that they couldn’t do their jobs without it.  On ships with combat 
systems, the operators lean on that data instead.  Everyone is really 
expecting a real-time system, and they know GCCS-M was not designed 
to be that type of system.  Overall, it does what we built it to do.” 
F. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
• “It isn’t that GCCS-M has reluctance to adopt technology, it’s just that 
technology takes forever to get out there.  I honestly give you credit for 
embracing technology.  Let’s talk about 3DCOP – there’s an example of 
technology that you proactively looked at.  But tied to return on 
investment and the speed issue, releases don’t go out very often and we 
don’t refresh the technology.” 
• “Quarterly releases are too aggressive; annual would be a good objective 
to shoot for.  Those releases should go through an abbreviated assessment 
that would not require a full OT.” 
• “GCCS-M has actively pursued technology, but has been held back by 
dependencies on delayed next generation capabilities such as the COE and 
the challenges of moving a sustained base forward to next generation 
technologies.” 
• “I think we’ve done better in the past few years at leveraging science and 
technology investments.  The Fleet Battle Experiments are a good 
example of this.” 
• “Consider being more aggressive with XTCF in order to ensure GCCS-M 
has a seat at the table in Situation Awareness.” 
• “When industry decides to incorporate technology, it spends a lot of 
money because you have to show a very direct link between investment 
and financial return on investment.” 
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• “The Fleet experimentation process is broken, because you just show up 
with what you have.  In IT, it is hard to distinguish between what each 
player is bringing.  Frequently, the recognized successes are riding on 
infrastructure provided by someone else who is not getting recognized 
(like GCCS-M).” 
• “We’ve talked about a few new technologies, but we really haven’t 
transitioned a whole lot.  We have picked up many commercial 
technologies.  We were way ahead on web-enablement.  From an operator 
perspective, I think we are moving as fast as the CONOPS and learning 
methods are changing.” 
• “The technology adoption and transition process within GCCS-M is ad-
hoc.  We either get beat up for not telling you about a good idea sooner, or 
if we do tell you about it early, all we hear back that you have to POM for 
it and it will take at least 3 years if we get anything at all.  We need to be 
implementing something similar to what the submarine community does, 
called SUBTECH.  They have a formal and fair process, including an 
R&D group and allocations in the POM process for emerging 
technologies.  We do not have a good, seamless approach for getting new 
technology into the product.” 
• “A previous PM was here for three years before he met the ONR C2 block 
head, just three weeks before he left.  That’s not right.” 
• “We get a new whiz-bang tool developed and ready to go, but then there 
isn’t enough money to give it to everyone.   We then have to make very 
hard decisions about who gets what, and in the end decide who doesn’t get 
a warfighting capability.” 
• “We can support 30 year old UYK-20’s, but we can’t support 18 month 
old commercial servers.  We’ve gotten into the habit that we have to move 
forward with technology just because there is a new or improved version 
available.  Why do we need to do that?  We haven’t attached any 
performance or operational requirements to this chase of technology.  
What is Netscape 6 doing that Netscape 5.5 didn’t do?  The same thing is 
true on the hardware side.  Things keep getting better and faster, but what 
performance improvement does that bring in capability terms.  I would 
have thought the budget situation would stop us from doing this, but it 
hasn’t.” 
• “Commercial vendors change the size and form factor of their equipment 
without telling anyone.  The government has no configuration 
management of the form factor.  We engineer mounts and brackets to hold 
these things, and then the COTS vendor delivers something that just 
doesn’t fit.  We don’t always think about these things until the installer is 
on the ship, and it’s a crisis.” 
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G. ARCHITECTURE COMPLIANCE 
• “Continue to move towards a single Joint architecture with common Joint 
applications.” 
• “Utilize and fully expose data, and utilize enterprise services.” 
• “If you look at what we do and how we spend our money, it is on Joint 
interoperability and architecture.  It’s not on capabilities and shipboard 
interoperability.  We need to make sure we have the right balance here.  I 
don’t think we are balanced today.” 
• “Excellent.  If it hadn’t been for compliance with COE none of the things 
we’ve done would have successful.” 
• “I think it was the right decision to put the architecture before the 
capability.  The Windows architecture was there before industry knew 
how to use IT.  People didn’t need to worry about whether the file sent 
across country would work on another machine.  DOD approached this 
from a different perspective.  The biggest gorilla said that COE was the 
law of the land.  Those who listened built interoperable systems.  Those 
who didn’t built stovepipes.  The drawback is that people see the tools and 
say they can figure out how to use them without learning the business of 
C2.  Now we need to figure out how the tool business logic can adopt yet 
be flexible enough to accommodate unexpected uses driven by operational 
need.” 
• “If we truly complied with the architecture, we should be able to take one 
of our apps and load it on the GCCS-J system.  We can’t do that today, 
and a lot of people know that.” 
• “Putting architecture ahead of capability is like building a solid foundation 
for your house.  You could build a beautiful house on fragile stilts, but if 
you do this you don’t have stable foundation and the whole thing could 
blow away in the first storm.” 
• “We put a whole lot of money into 4.X, just to maintain interoperability 
with GCCS-M.” 
• “The architecture is the foundation of GCCS-M, it defined and created C2 
interoperability.” 
• “Architectures are not the end state, the capability is.  The guy on the ship 
doesn’t stop to think what architecture is being used.  All he cares about is 
whether he can communicate with who he wants to, or put bombs on 
target.” 
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H. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
• “The plan is in place to get there, but there are a lot of dependencies.  
Today there are some holes and gaps due to the service approved ORD 
that ripple throughout.” 
• “I’m glad we didn’t pay attention to this when we started, otherwise we 
wouldn’t be here.  I would hate to see it become excellent.” 
• “Under the ACAT II, this was poor, but over the past few years we have 
come along way.  Now the biggest problem is folks sitting on our 
paperwork.” 
I. PROGRAM PLANNING AND RESOURCING 
• “The question is whether we are getting our dollars worth considering the 
rate we turn products out.  I’m worried that we are falling behind the 
customer’s reasonable expectations.” 
• “The problem is that the Navy doesn’t have enough resources to do 
everything it wants to continue doing.  So, we are under-resourcing almost 
everything we do.  Some of our sister services don’t do that, but we do.  
We would rather have more systems limping along than fewer systems 
that are in good health, so GCCS-M is a victim of that mentality along 
with many other programs.  I think now you need to be making the case 
for higher availability and robustness of your system as a nearly critical 
warfighting element.  In the past you have been a C4I informational 
system.  The way I read lessons learned out of OIF that’s not the case any 
more; they can’t do their job without GCCS-M.  We need to begin to 
make that argument at the resourcing table.” 
• “Should JC2 MA be a new start?  If it will still be an ACAT I program 
then I don’t see much reason not to continue with spiral development 
under the existing program structure.”   
• “You will need to have a balance between supporting the current system 
and enhancing for the future.   
• “Who is going to support COE for the seven years we have it in the Fleet, 
before we get to NCES?  In their budget DISA has decimated support for 
COE because they are putting all their eggs in the future basket.  I 
recommend continuing with a spiral model and make arguments at the 
budget table when someone tries to cut GCCS-M.” 
• “We need to correct the build-to-budget mindset that has developed 
because we are not funded to threshold requirements.  We need to force 
the hard decisions needed to make the resources available, if we really 
want the capability.” 
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• “Within the resources available, GCCS-M has laid out a plan to deliver 
capability.” 
• “The requirements and resourcing system is not working for IT programs.  
It is not poor for IT programs that deal with bandwidth, because that is 
something people can see, but it is certainly poor for the mushy 
capabilities like GCCS-M.  I believe there is a perception that you can “go 
cheap” on integration of applications.  You can’t do that anymore.  
Program managers do what they can do with the funding available, but 
that encourages bridges to nowhere that look effective on a small scale but 
don’t integrate back together.” 
• “In the next war, I would rather have one less airplane airborne and be 
able to react quickly across the enterprise.  There is a lot of C2 capability 
that could be built with the funds required to buy one JSF.  But I wouldn’t 
cut a ship.” 
• “The resourcing problem needs to be solved by a team approach, including 
the program office, OPNAV, NETWARCOM, and CFFC.” 
• “Right now we are so busy taking care of the immediate concerns that we 
are not looking ahead.  We need to rethink why every ship in the Navy 
needs GCCS-M.  What is the justification for putting GCCS-M on an 
AOE?  We need to take a look at missions, not platforms.  We need to take 
missions and figure out what C2 capabilities are required to support each 
mission.  What missions does an AOE perform?  This is the biggest 
shortfall in the requirements process.  This analysis needs to be performed 
by the N3’s, and right now they just say we need everything.  OPNAV 
should have the lead on this since it is strategic, but we really need N3 
involvement.” 
• “Sometimes I have plenty of money but it’s the wrong color to do what 
needs to get done.  I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld, the whole budget 
system needs reworked.” 
• “Senior leadership in the Navy has failed the Fleet miserably, because the 
budget for the Navy C4I capability has been static.  IT-21 is roughly 
$300M per year.  The Navy has $88B dollars per year.  IT-21 is the soul of 
C4I in the Fleet.  The first thing the US military goes after is the C2 of the 
bad guy.  Of that $300M, most of that is for installation labor and travel.  
The Fleet only gets about $80M to actually procure equipment each year.  
This is insanity.  We have to get capability end to end across the 
Battlegroup.  The budget needs to support delivery of an integrated and 
interoperable end-to-end capability, that is linked up between both LANT 
and PAC.” 
• “We don’t have technical issues with our C2 capability, we have money 
issues.  A B-2 bomber plus its spare parts and infrastructure is about $1B.  
In the next conflict, will a single B-2 bomber make a strategic difference?  
I don’t think it will.  If you invested that $1B in Navy C2, it will make a 
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strategic difference.  We have not been able to articulate what C4I is 
worth.  This is the K-Mart special office, and today’s blue light special is 
on GCCS-M.  I would sacrifice a ship, but I’m not sure CNO would.  It is 
our collective job to sell this end-to-end capability, and we are not doing it 
effectively.” 
• “The Fleet likes the IT-21 matrix because that’s the only time we get a say 
in priorities.  Sometimes we see program office schedules that just don’t 
make sense.” 
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